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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does the Subpoena Act violate constitutionally 
protected rights of personal liberty, including the right to 
not give evidence against or incriminate oneself and the right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures? 
2. Is the Subpoena Act unconstitutionally vague and 
violative of due process because it fails to set forth 
essential procedural safeguards necessary to avoid 
unconstitutional and arbitrary enforcement? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Statutes and constitutional provisions determinative 
of the issues on appeal are set forth in Addendum I attached 
hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the Attorney General's appeal from an order of 
the Seventh Judicial District Court ruling that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-22-1 through 3 (1982) (the "Subpoena Act'1) is 
unconstitutional and withdrawing judicial authorization for an 
investigation conducted by the Attorney General's office under 
the Subpoena Act. The decision was entered by Judge Boyd 
Bunnell on September 20, 1984 and is attached as Addendum III. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 26, 1983, Judge Boyd Bunnell authorized the 
Attorney General's office to conduct a criminal investigation 
pursuant to the Subpoena Act. R. at 8. At that time, the 
court further ordered that the Subpoena Act's secrecy provision 
should apply. R. at 4. Thereafter the Utah Attorney General 
issued numerous subpoenas. Colby, Stott and Maxfield were each 
subpoenaed in April, 1984. Copies of their subpoenas are 
attached as Addendum II. 
On May 14, 1984, Maxfield, Stott, and Colby moved to 
quash the subpoenas duces tecum on the basis that the Subpoena 
Act is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. R. at 57, 
62. The Attorney General responded with a Request for Order 
Requiring Testimony and Production of Documents. R. at 136. 
On May 30, 1984, Judge Bunnell heard the foregoing motions and 
thereafter ruled the Subpoena Act constitutional, but set forth 
constitutional guidelines to be followed by prosecuting 
attorneys under the Subpoena Act. The May 30 ruling is 
attached as part of Addendum III. 
On July 13, 1984, Colby, Stott and Maxfield filed a 
Motion to Reconsider the Court's May 30, 1984 order in part on 
the 'basis of newly discovered legislative history indicating 
that the Subpoena Act does not reflect true legislative intent 
1
 The following abbreviations are used for the 
purpose of citation in this Brief: (1) "R." stands for the 
record on appeal, (2) "A.G.'s Br." stands for the Utah Attorney 
General's brief on appeal and (3) "Decision" means the 
September 12, 1984 Memorandum Decision Relative to 
Constitutionality by Judge Boyd Bunnell. 
and further on the basis that judicial rewriting of a statute 
to avoid a constitutional attack is not permissible. R. at 
255. Thereafter, the Attorney General withdrew all outstanding 
subpoenas issued under the investigation except one to the 
custodian of records of Emery. On August 21, 1984, Emery moved 
to quash this only outstanding subpoena. R. at 633. 
On September 12, 1984, Judge Bunnell considered the 
Motion to Reconsider of Colby, Stott and Maxfield, the 
Company's motion for a protective order, and Emery's motion to 
quash. At that time, Judge Bunnell quashed the outstanding 
subpoena to Emery and took under advisement the issues as to 
the constitutionality of the Subpoena Act. 
On September 20, 1984, Judge Bunnell issued his 
Memorandum Decision Relative to Constitutionality holding the 
Subpoena Act unconstitutional. The criminal investigation 
authorized by the Subpoena Act was accordingly dismissed. R. 
at 734. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
To fully appreciate the constitutional issues raised 
on this appeal, it will be helpful to keep in mind that the 
Subpoena Act confers on the prosecutorial arm of government 
criminal investigative powers far beyond those existing in the 
federal system and under state laws generally. The statute 
grants to the State's prosecutors virtually unlimited 
discretion to carry out criminal investigations unfettered by 
judicial restraint, but under the guise of court authority. 
The Subpoena Act provides that the prosecuting attorneys of 
Utah, upon the approval of the district court, may conduct a 
criminal investigation. Once having received the court's 
general approval of the investigation, prosecuting attorneys 
may issue subpoenas to obtain evidence and documents deemed 
relevant to the prosecutor. The prosecuting attorneys may also 
have the district court order, as in the case at bar, that the 
proceedings be secret. The statute does not require that 
self-incrimination or any other warnings be given to witnesses 
or targets of the investigation except their entitlement to be 
represented by counsel. Further, prosecuting attorneys are not 
required to obtain court approval prior to issuance of 
subpoenas or to file a return of service of subpoenas so that 
the court's file contains a complete record of subpoenas issued. 
Prior to the enactment of the Subpoena Act in 1980, 
Utah law enforcement officials (prosecutors and police) had the 
following carefully limited investigative tools: 
1. A subpoena to testify or produce documents could 
be obtained under the 1971 version of the Subpoena Act, but 
only upon a court approved showing of "good cause" for the 
issuance of each subpoena. In 1980 this important safeguard 
was eliminated, without discussion, during a busy budget 
session. See excerpts from 1971 and 1980 legislative history, 
attached as Addendum IV. 
2. A search warrant could be obtained, but only upon 
a showing of probable cause to an impartial magistrate, and 
under defined limitations. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-3(1) (1982). 
The Subpoena Act sweeps away the previously existing 
"probable caused requirements to obtain evidence, and grants 
the prosecution heretofore unseen powers of criminal 
investigation. In express violation of the Fourth Amendment 
requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable, the 
prosecutor may now unilaterally subpoena witnesses and 
documents upon his subjective determination that evidence 
sought is relevant to the authorized investigation. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-22-2(1) (1982). 
Ironically, the Subpoena Act confers greater 
investigative powers upon a prosecutor than those hitherto 
reserved to the Utah grand jury. Under Utah law a grand jury 
must warn a witness that he is a target of the investigation 
and advise him of his rights against self-incrimination. 
Further, a grand jury may receive only "legal evidence." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-11-3 (1982). The irony, of course, is that 
even greater powers of investigation are now in the hands of 
the prosecutor—the entity against which grand juries serve as 
a buffer to protect the suspected and accused. 
The breadth of the investigative powers enjoyed by a 
grand jury has always been premised on the existence of vital 
assumptions about the grand jury process. See U.S. v. 
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 45 (1973), Marshall J., dissenting. The 
grand jury finds its roots in the beginnings of the common 
law. Historically and in practice, the grand jury has served 
as "an investigative body 'acting independently of either 
prosecuting attorney or judge,' (citation omitted) whose 
mission is to clear the innocent no less than to bring to trial 
those who may be guilty. . . . " U.S. v. Dionisio, supra, 410 
U.S. at 16-17. The grand jury serves "as a protective bulwark 
standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an 
over zealous prosecutor . . . ." Id.. (emphasis added). See 
also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Hale v. Henkel, 201 
U.S. 43, 59 (1906). The vesting of traditional grand jury 
powers in the prosecutor encourages and has resulted in the 
abuse of the investigative process. 
Although Judge Bunnell had only a handful of the 
subpoenas that have been issued in this criminal investigation 
before him, he concluded that: 
The Act has been abused and is subject to 
continued abuse under its broad terms and 
provisions that set no limitations upon the 
State or any guidelines to the use of their 
subpoena p o w e r . . . . 
This Court has, therefore concluded that the 
Act is too vague and does not give proper 
protection to individual citizens against the 
violation of their constitutional right of due 
process and protection against self 
incrimination and allows for an absolute abuse 
of power without the benefit of judicial 
review or control once the general subpoena 
power is granted and finds the Act is 
unconstitutional. 
Decision at 4. 
Judge Bunnell's conclusion is premised in part on his 
determination that the Attorney General has used the unfettered 
discretion granted him under the Subpoena Act to subpoena 
documents that are plainly irrelevant to the investigation and 
upon his determination that subpoenas served are overbroad in 
light of the authorized scope of the investigation. 
The Subpoena Actfs sanction of "an absolute abuse of 
power," in Judge Bunnell's words, is the natural consequence of 
certain critical deficiencies in the statute. The exorbitant 
breadth and scope of information sought is attributable to the 
absolute discretion granted the prosecutor. Information sought 
pursuant to the Subpoena Act need only be "relevant to the 
investigation in the judgment of the attorney general or county 
attorney." Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2(1) (1982). The Attorney 
General is thus vested by the Subpoena Act with complete 
discretion to determine what is relevant. 
In addition to granting a prosecutor virtually 
complete discretion to delve into the personal lives of Utah 
citizens, the Subpoena Act fails to provide witnesses with 
vital protections that even a witness subpoenaed by a Utah 
grand jury would have—the right to be advised if he is a 
target of an investigation and of his privilege against 
self-incrimination. Further, the judicial oversight present in 
the grand jury system is absent under the Subpoena Act. 
Because the Subpoena Act permits an investigation to 
be conducted in complete secrecy, an individual served with a 
subpoena has no means whatsoever to intelligently determine 
whether the information sought is relevant to the matters under 
investigation by the prosecutor and therefore lawful in light 
of Fourth Amendment constraints. Alternatively, if a 
prosecutor chooses to not invoke the secrecy allowed under the 
Act, a prosecutor may conduct a public investigation with the 
result that innocent suspects may be subject to public 
incrimination by virtue of their association with a criminal 
investigation. 
For reasons set out in more detail below, the 
deficiencies in the Subpoena Act render it unconstitutional in 
several respects. It authorizes unreasonable searches and 
seizures, fails to provide adequate safeguards to protect the 
privilege against self-incrimination, and otherwise denies 
procedural safeguards inherent in due process. The failure of 
the Subpoena Act to establish minimal constitutional safeguards 
further renders the Subpoena Act void for vagueness. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SUBPOENA ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITS AND ENCOURAGES 
THE VIOLATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PERSONAL 
LIBERTY. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provide the 
people of Utah with fundamental protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The security of one's 
privacy against arbitrary governmental intrusion is at the core 
of the Fourth Amendment and basic to a free society. See, 
e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961). Gouled 
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
Fourth Amendment rights are respected as foundational 
of our political and social system. The United States Supreme 
Court has "consistently asserted that the rights of privacy and 
personal security protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . are 
to be regarded as of the very essence of constitutional 
liberty . . . ." Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 
(1947). The Fourth Amendment protections apply whether the 
invasion is made through a subpoena duces tecum or a search 
warrant. Donovan v. Lone Steer, U.S. , 52 U.S. L.W. 
4087, 4089 (1984); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, (1960), 
rehearing den. 364 U.S. 855; Federal Trade Commission v. 
American Tobacco Company, 264 U.S. 298 (1923); Hale v. Henkel, 
201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
The Attorney General defends the Subpoena Act's Fourth 
Amendment deficiencies essentially on the basis that every 
citizen's Fourth Amendment rights are adequately protected by 
the implicit right to obtain pre-compliance judicial review of 
a subpoena duces tecum by moving to quash on Fourth Amendment 
grounds. Contrary to this view, the Subpoena Act expressly 
allows the prosecuting attorneys of Utah to serve and demand 
compliance with constitutionally defective subpoenas. 
Furthermore the secrecy and penal nature of the statutory 
framework created by the Subpoena Act and related rules 
discourages the assertion of Fourth Amendment rights and 
consequently encourages abuse of prosecutorial subpoena power. 
A. The Subpoena Act Expressly Permits the Unreasonable 
Compulsion of Evidence by Creating a Subjective 
Standard of Relevance. 
Counsel for respondents Stott, Colby and Maxfield have 
extensively researched both state and federal law relating to 
the subpoena power of a prosecuting attorney and have 
discovered no authority validating a statute granting the 
prosecutorial agency of government the breadth of discretion to 
compel testimony and documents pursuant to a secret or public 
inquisitorial process, as sanctioned by the Subpoena Act. 
Respondents do not disagree with the concept that 
extensive legal powers are enjoyed by a grand jury or 
-10-
administrative agency to issue subpoenas. However/ Respondents 
take issue with the analysis that such power compels the 
conclusion that the Subpoena Act sustains a Fourth Amendment 
attack where such powers are given to a prosecutor who under 
the Subpoena Act also holds the power to (1) investigate in 
secret or public proceedings/ (2) bring charges based on such 
investigation and (3) prosecute charges resulting therefrom 
with adversarial zeal. 
The Attorney General relies extensively on Oklahoma 
Press Pub. Co. v. Walling/ 327 U.S. 186 (1946) for the 
proposition that a federal agency may constitutionally issue 
subpoenas, without prior judicial approval/ so long as: (1) 
each subpoena is issued pursuant to an investigation having a 
lawfully authorized purpose, (2) the documents or evidence 
sought are relevant to the inquiry/ and (3) the documents to be 
produced are not unduly broad or burdensome and are adequately 
described. The Court in Walling/ supra# observes that if a 
citizen believes a subpoena violates his Fourth Amendment 
rights/ he may obtain access to the courts to quash the 
subpoena. Assuming, arguendo/ that Walling is determinative of 
the constitutional issues here, the Subpoena Act cannot 
2 
withstand the standards set forth therein. 
2
 The facts before the Court in Walling are 
importantly distinguishable from the facts at issue here. 
The essential "relevancy" standard found in Walling is 
absent from the Subpoena Act. Walling necessarily requires an 
objective determination of relevance, such determination being 
a principal part of the equation for testing the 
"reasonableness" of the seizure of documents under the Fourth 
Amendment. 327 U.S. at 208. Walling does not stand for the 
proposition that "relevance" may be determined by the issuing 
party. Otherwise/ the availability of judicial review to 
determine the reasonableness of a subpoena would be meaningless. 
The Subpoena Act, in contravention of the 
constitutional requirement that subpoenas be "relevant", 
provides that the prosecuting attorney may subpoena evidence 
which he deems relevant. Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2(1) (1982). 
^ (Continued) First, the issues in the case did not 
involve an attack on the validity of a statute authorizing 
subpoena power. Rather, the question was whether an agency 
could conduct a fishing expedition into books and records in 
order to secure evidence that petitioners had violated the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 211(a) (1938). The obvious 
distinction between an administrator issuing subpoenas under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Attorney General 
subpoenaing records are that: (1) a person served with a 
subpoena by the federal agency knows the nature of the inquiry 
by virtue of the agency serving the subpoena, i.e., the 
subpoena relates to matters authorized for investigation under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (not any one of a multitude of 
crimes found throughout the criminal statutes in Utah); (2) 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, unlike the Subpoena Act, does not 
endow an agency with rights and powers of secrecy which prevent 
a party from being served with a subpoena from having any 
knowledge regarding the nature and scope of the investigation 
or the target of the investigation. 
A literal interpretation of the Subpoena Act requires a judge 
reviewing the lawfulness of the subpoena under the Subpoena Act 
to uphold its validity so long as a prosecutor can make a good 
faith showing that in his or her judgment the subpoena requires 
evidence relevant to the investigation. This would be true 
notwithstanding the fact that a judge, exercising his own 
independent review, is not in agreement with the reasonableness 
of the request. The subjective test of relevance in the 
Subpoena Act stands in express violation of the Fourth 
Amendment requirement that subpoenas be objectively reasonable. 
It is no surprise that, as described more fully below, 
several subpoenas issued by the Attorney General under the 
Subpoena Act have been abusive. The Attorney General admits in 
his brief that he has interpreted and applied the Subpoena Act 
in a manner totally at odds with the constitutional 
requirements set out in Walling. In the Attorney Generalfs 
view, the evidence sought is "relevant" as long as it "is not 
plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the 
agency . . . ." A.G.'s Br. at 23-24. In support of this 
extraordinarily broad interpretation of the constitutional 
concept of relevance, the Attorney General cites Endicott 
Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943) where the Fourth 
Amendment rights were not at issue. The Attorney General, 
then, according to his interpretation, may subpoena documents 
which in his mind are not plainly irrelevant. Such broad power 
to compel evidence cannot withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 
B. The Statutory Scheme Effectively Precludes Meaningful 
Judicial Review of Subpoenas. 
In defense of his position that pre-compliance 
judicial review cures any constitutional defect in the exercise 
of subpoena power, the Attorney General states that any attempt 
to circumvent an unconstitutional subpoena ,,willn be thwarted 
by the court upon motion. A.G.'s Br. at 17. In the same 
thought the Attorney General observes that any failure to so 
object will constitute a waiver of protected rights. JA. With 
these affirmative statements in mind, it is interesting to note 
that the Attorney General has been pursuing a criminal 
investigation since January, 1983. R. at 4. Presumably during 
that period the Attorney General has issued numerous subpoenas 
which have been responded to. It was not until May, 1984, that 
any party objected or moved to quash a subpoena. That 
objection was made by Respondents Colby, Stott and Maxfield on 
May 25, 1984. 
It is not surprising that there have been few 
objections to subpoenas. First, the subpoenas in the Record 
nowhere advise a witness of his asserted right to quash. 
Moreover, the subpoenas in the record (and presumably all 
subpoenas issued in the criminal investigation) explicitly 
provide that "[t]his subpoena duces tecum is authorized by 
order of the District Court« Disobedience to this order is 
punishable by contempt of Court." See Addendum II. While the 
Attorney General's threat of contempt of court may be 
misleading in that it may be misinterpreted to mean a court has 
specifically reviewed and ordered the subpoena, the threat has 
force and meaning under the Utah Criminal Rules of Procedure. 
Under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure "failure to obey a 
subpoena without reasonable excuse may be deemed a contempt of 
court by the court responsible for its issuance". Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-14(g) (1982). The threat of being penalized for 
failure to comply, together with the respect for and fear of 
the authority of the prosecutor serving a subpoena necessarily 
acts as a real and practical deterrent to the free exercise of 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
Justice Murphy, dissenting in Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. 
v. Walling, 327 U.S. 217 (1946), aptly characterized the impact 
of agency subpoenas: 
To allow a non-judicial officer, 
unarmed with judicial process, to demand the 
books and papers of an individual is an open 
invitation to abuse of that power. It is no 
answer that the individual may refuse to 
produce the material demanded. Many persons 
have yielded solely because of the air of 
authority with which the demand is made, a 
demand that cannot be enforced without 
subsequent judicial aid. Many invasions of 
private rights thus occur without the 
restraining hand of the judiciary ever 
intervening. . . . Liberty is too priceless 
to be forfeited through the zeal of an 
administrative agent. 
327 U.S. at 219. 
The potential for abuse under the Subpoena Act is even 
greater than that observed by Justice Murphy where the subpoena 
power rests in the hands of a zealous prosecutor. See, e.g., 
In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 336 (1957); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 
395 U.S. 411 (1969) discussed infra. 
The secrecy provisions of the Subpoena Act further 
discourage the assertion of fundamental rights. According to 
the Attorney General, the Subpoena Act allows a prosecutor to 
decline disclosure of the nature of-the pending investigation 
or whether a witness is a target of the investigation. See 
Addendum II, excerpts from Darcey White deposition. Without 
such knowledge it is impossible for a party compelled to submit 
documentary evidence to assess the relevancy and therefore the 
constitutionality of a subpoena. Under the framework of the 
Subpoena Act, each subpoena must be questioned for 
constitutionality inasmuch as the validity thereof is 
impossible to test absent a request for judicial review 
regarding relevancy. The fact that Respondents Colby, Stott 
and Maxfield were the first to request their constitutional 
right to judicial review indicates that the secrecy provisions 
of the Subpoena Act/ together with the fear of contempt 
penalties and the intimidating authority of prosecuting 
attorneys has effectively discouraged and deterred the exercise 
of the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures by the other participants in the criminal 
investigation. 
C. The Subpoena Act Sanctions Prosecutor Fishing 
Expeditions. 
It is fundamental that a government investigation 
cannot be used to engage in a fishing expedition. Long ago, in 
Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Company, 264 U.S. 
298 (1923), Justice Holmes said: 
Anyone who respects the spirit as well as 
the letter of the Fourth Amendment would be 
loath to believe that Congress intended to 
authorize one of its subordinate agencies to 
sweep all our traditions into the fire 
(citations omitted) and to direct fishing 
expeditions into private papers on the 
possibility that they may disclose evidence 
of a crime. 
Id. at 306 (emphasis added). 
Due to the secrecy employed by the Attorney General, 
it cannot be stated unequivocally that the Attorney General is 
conducting an unconstitutional fishing expedition. However, 
the circumstantial facts indicate that this is so. Perhaps the 
most telling indication is the Attorney General's actions in 
the proceedings below. Shortly after Colby, Stott and Maxfield 
moved below for reconsideration of Judge Bunnell's May 30, 1984 
ruling, the Attorney General withdrew all outstanding 
subpoenas, save one directed to Emery. Significantly this 
subpoena, the only one not withdrawn, was quashed by Judge 
Bunnell as "too broad in any investigation of any criminal 
activity". Decision at 2. 
Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra, which the 
Attorney General argues sets the controlling standard in this 
case, requires that to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a subpoena 
duces tecum may not be overly broad or burdensome and it may 
request only "relevant" evidence. 
Although only a handful of them are in the record, 
several of the subpoenas duces tecum issued in this criminal 
investigation fail to meet the Walling standard. Respondents 
Stott and Colby were each "commanded to bring . . . any and all 
books, records, documents, accounts, or papers pertaining to 
Utah Power & Light including, but not limited to: information 
and documentation regarding all uranium properties purchased, 
controlled and managed by Utah Power & Light . . . ." See 
Addendum II. The request is not limited by time, by specific 
document, the type of document, or the individual preparing the 
document. Literally, the subpoenas require production of all 
books and records pertaining to Utah Power and Light Company. 
Judge Bunnell found that the subpoenas requested 
irrelevant documents, because they "attempted to get into Utah 
Power and Light Company's dealings in uranium mining, when in 
fact the original Good Cause Affidavit mentioned no indication 
of any criminal dealings in this area." Decision at 2. 
The subpoena duces tecum served on Emery Mining 
Company commanded it to produce: 
Records which identify all officers, 
directors, consultants, and employees (both 
union and non-union, professional and 
mining) of Emery Mining for the period 1979 
to the present. Such shall include, but not 
be limited to, names, addresses, telephone 
numbers, dates of employment and employee 
numbers, if known. 
Decision at 2. 
This request is similarly not limited by subject 
matter, the specific document or type of document, but requires 
the production of documents over an indefinite period of time 
and may require production of numerous documents irrelevant to 
the government's investigation. Accordingly, Judge Bunnell 
ordered it "suppressed as being too broad in any investigation 
of any criminal activity." Id. The overbreadth, lack of 
specificity, and unlimited time periods covered by the 
subpoenas duces tecum illustrate the "fishing expedition" 
nature of the investigation and reveal the abusive exploitation 
of the Act by the Attorney General. 
II. THE SUBPOENA ACT VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE PRIVILEGE NOT 
TO GIVE EVIDENCE AGAINST ONESELF. 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides all citizens with the privilege against 
self-incrimination. Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution provides the more expansive right that a person 
may not be compelled to give evidence against himself. Hansen 
v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980). 
The secrecy provisions of the Subpoena Act (according 
to the Attorney General) empower prosecuting attorneys to 
refuse to inform a witness who is the target of a criminal 
investigation that he is the target and to refuse to disclose 
to him the nature of the investigation, with the effect that a 
suspected participant in a crime is denied the right to make an 
intelligent decision to invoke his privilege of not giving 
evidence against himself. A.G.'s Br. at 28-34. 
In State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 
(1967), this court held that a person under investigation by a 
grand jury must be informed that he is the target of the 
investigation, the nature of the charges against him, and in 
connection therewith, he must be informed of his constitutional 
right not to be a witness against himself. 429 P.2d at 973. 
In so doing the court recognized that inherent in 
constitutional privileges is the right to exercise them 
intelligently. 429 P.2d at at 975. 
In Ruggeri, a county commissioner was called before 
the grand jury. Unbeknownst to him, he was the target of the 
grand jury investigation which subsequently indicted him and 
others. He was also subsequently indicted for perjury in 
connection with the testimony obtained by the district attorney 
before the grand jury. The district court suppressed the 
evidence given by the county commissioner, and this court 
upheld the ruling, basing its opinion on Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution and the United States Supreme Court 
decision, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The court 
acknowledged the rule that an ordinary witness before a grand 
jury must give testimony except where it might incriminate him, 
but that 
[0]ne being investigated for crime is not 
just a witness and cannot be treated as 
such. The target of an investigation is an 
accused within the meaning of the 
Constitution, and when he is detained in any 
significant way, he may not be interrogated 
unless he is advised of the charges against 
him then under consideration. To> fail to so 
warn one so being investigated is to entrap 
him and to violate his constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
Id. at 973. (emphasis added). 
Implicit in Ruggeri is the notion that it is an 
integral part of each citizen's constitutional right against 
self-incrimination that one have the knowledge necessary to 
make an informed decision to exercise or waive such right: 
It would seem that a witness who is unaware 
that he is a target of a grand jury 
investigation could not intelligently 
determine whether or not he needed counsel 
unless he was fully advised of the charges 
being considered against him; and until he 
has full knowledge regarding that matter, he 
will not know when to assert his 
constitutional claim of privilege against 
self incrimination. It would also be 
difficult to believe that he could 
intelligently waive the right to counsel 
under such circumstances, 
429 P.2d at 975. 
The Attorney General argues that Ruggeri is not 
necessarily good law, noting that there is apparently no 
Miranda warning requirement in federal grand jury proceedings. 
In fact the United States Supreme Court has specifically 
declined to rule whether a grand jury witness must be warned of 
his or her Fifth Amendment privilege. United States v. 
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186, 190-191 (1977); United States v. 
Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 
564, 582 (1976). The Circuit Courts are split on the 
question. United States v. Jacobs, 574 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 
1976), cert, dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978) (warning is 
required); United States v. Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049 (3rd Cir. 
1977) (no warning required). This body of federal law cited by 
the Attorney General is certainly no authority for a holding 
that the Ruggeri rule is wrong. If anything, it upholds the 
merit of the Ruggeri decision, A state court cannot interpret 
a statute to restrict the fundamental constitutional right to 
exercise the privilege against self incrimination, but a state 
court has authority to more liberally construe those rights to 
protect against governmental incursions into personal liberty. 
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966). 
As discussed infra, the rule laid down in Ruggeri, 
regarding the rights of a witness before a grand jury 
proceeding, necessarily applies with greater force in an 
investigatory proceeding under the Subpoena Act where the 
protective shield of the grand jury does not stand as a buffer 
between the accuser and the accused. 
III. THE STATUTORY GRANT OF BROAD INVESTIGATORY POWERS TO A 
PROSECUTOR VIOLATES DUE PROCESS. 
A#
 Due Process Requires that a Prosecutor's Investigation 
Powers be More Carefully Circumscribed Than Those of A 
Grand Jury or Administrative Agency. 
Without analysis, the Attorney General equates the 
legitimacy of investigative powers conferred by the Subpoena 
Act with the powers of investigation granted to grand juries, 
A.G.'s Br., at 23-4, and the investigatory powers conferred on 
various administrative agencies. A.G.'s Br. at 19. In effect, 
the Attorney General's position is that it makes no 
self-incrimination that one have the knowledge necessary to 
make an informed decision to exercise or waive such right: 
It would seem that a witness who is unaware 
that he is a target of a grand jury 
investigation could not intelligently 
determine whether or not he needed counsel 
unless he was fully advised of the charges 
being considered against him; and until he 
has full knowledge regarding that matter, he 
will not know when to assert his 
constitutional claim of privilege against 
self incrimination. It would also be 
difficult to believe that he could 
intelligently waive the right to counsel 
under such circumstances. 
429 P.2d at 975. 
The Attorney General argues that Ruggeri is not 
necessarily good law, noting that there is apparently no 
Miranda warning requirement in federal grand jury proceedings. 
In fact the United States Supreme Court has specifically 
declined to rule whether a grand jury witness must be warned of 
his or her Fifth Amendment privilege. United States v. 
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186, 190-191 (1977); United States v. 
Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 
564, 582 (1976). The Circuit Courts are split on the 
question. United States v. Jacobs, 574 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 
1976), cert, dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978) (warning is 
required); United States v. Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049 (3rd Cir. 
1977) (no warning required). This body of federal law cited by 
the Attorney General is certainly no authority for a holding 
that the Ruggeri rule is wrong. If anything, it upholds the 
merit of the Ruggeri decision. A state court cannot interpret 
a statute to restrict the fundamental constitutional right to 
exercise the privilege against self incrimination, but a state 
court has authority to more liberally construe those rights to 
protect against governmental incursions into personal liberty. 
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966). 
As discussed infra, the rule laid down in Ruggeri, 
regarding the rights of a witness before a grand jury 
proceeding, necessarily applies with greater force in an 
investigatory proceeding under the Subpoena Act where the 
protective shield of the grand jury does not stand as a buffer 
between the accuser and the accused. 
III. THE STATUTORY GRANT OF BROAD INVESTIGATORY POWERS TO A 
PROSECUTOR VIOLATES DUE PROCESS. 
A. Due Process Requires that a Prosecutor's Investigation 
Powers be More Carefully Circumscribed Than Those of A 
Grand Jury or Administrative Agency. 
Without analysis, the Attorney General equates the 
legitimacy of investigative powers conferred by the Subpoena 
Act with the powers of investigation granted to grand juries, 
A.G.'s Br., at 23-4, and the investigatory powers conferred on 
various administrative agencies. A.G.'s Br. at 19. In effect, 
the Attorney General's position is that it makes no 
constitutional difference whatsoever who has been empowered to 
conduct a criminal investigation. 
The Attorney General overlooks perhaps the most 
offensive feature of the Subpoena Act—it grants the broad 
powers of investigation traditionally vested solely in a grand 
jury to the prosecutor, the public official whose sworn duty is 
to obtain convictions and put people in jail. The Attorney 
General ignores critical differences between the prosecutor, on 
the one hand, and the grand jury or administrative agency on 
the other. As demonstrated below, the broad powers of 
investigation granted to grand juries and administrative 
agencies is premised on vital assumptions about the roles 
played by those entities, assumptions which do not pertain when 
broad investigatory powers are conferred on a prosecutor. It 
is important to keep in mind that whether a particular grant of 
investigative authority is consistent with due process always 
depends on the specific facts and circumstances at issue: 
Due process is an elusive concept . . . . 
[It] embodies the differing rules of fair 
play, which through the years, have become 
associated with different types of 
proceedings. Whether the Constitution 
requires that a particular right obtain in a 
specific proceeding depends upon a 
complexity of factors. The nature of the 
alleged right involved, the nature of the 
proceeding, and the possible burden on that 
proceeding, are all considerations which 
must be taken into account. 
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). Accord In Re 
Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 337 (1957). 
1. The Broad Powers of Investigation Conferred on 
the Grand Jury are Predicated on its Historical Role as a 
Buffer Between the Accused and the Prosecutor. 
The grand jury system is of ancient common law origin 
and serves the purpose of providing protection against 
vindictive and malicious government prosecutions. Wood v. 
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). Historically and in practice, 
the grand jury has served as "an investigative body 'acting 
independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge, Stirone 
v. U.S., 361 U.S. 212, 218, whose mission is to clear the 
innocent no less than to bring to trial those who may be 
guilty." U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973). The 
grand jury serves "as a protective bulwark standing solidly 
between the ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor 
. . . . " Id., at 17. The role of the grand jury was expressed 
cogently by Justice Black: 
The traditional English and American grand 
jury is composed of 12 to 23 members 
selected from the general citizenry of the 
locality where the alleged crime was 
committed. They bring into the grand jury 
room the experience, knowledge and viewpoint 
of all sections of the community. They have 
no axes to grind and are not charged 
personally with the administration of the 
law. No one of them is a prosecuting 
attorney or law-enforcement officer 
ferreting out crime. It would be very 
difficult for officers of the state 
seriously to abuse or deceive a witness in 
the presence of the grand jury. 
In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 346-7 (1957), Black, J., 
dissenting. (Emphasis added). Although this language appears 
in a dissenting opinion, it unquestionably articulates the 
function of the grand jury in the administration of criminal 
justice. 
Implicit in the grand jury system is the notion that a 
prosecuting attorney may not act with the proper motives and 
objectivity during investigatory proceedings. The prosecutor 
is obviously different than a grand jury. He is the officer 
the grand jury is designed to protect the citizenry from. In 
light of the adversarial role the prosecutor plays in the 
criminal justice system, due process requires greater 
procedural protections when broad powers of investigation 
exercised by a prosecutor. 
2. Administrative Agencies Enjoy Broad Powers of 
Investigation Because, Unlike a Prosecutor, They Do Not 
Perform an Accusatory Function. 
Like the grand jury, administrative agencies enjoy 
broad powers of investigation due to the particular role they 
play in the governmental process. The United States Supreme 
Court has held that the requirements of due process are greater 
when investigatory powers are conferred on a prosecutor, as 
opposed to an administrative agency. In In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 
330 (1957)/ for example, the Court considered an Ohio statute 
authorizing a fire commissioner to subpoena and interrogate 
witnesses secretly to determine the cause of a fire. The Court 
upheld the statute against a claim that its failure to permit 
interrogated individuals to be represented by counsel violated 
due process. 
Six of the Justices in Grobaxi, however, articulated 
the crucial difference between granting investigatory powers to 
a purely fact-finding body as opposed to a prosecutor. Justice 
Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Harlan, 
agreed with the result of the majority opinion on the basis 
that the investigation performed by the fire commission served 
a purely fact-finding function. He distinguished the facts at 
bar from the prosecutorial power to conduct a secret 
investigation: 
What has been said disposes of the 
suggestion that, because this statute 
relating to a general administrative, 
non-prosecutorial inquiry into caiuses of 
fire is sustained, it would follow that 
secret inquisitorial powers given to a 
District Attorney would also have to be 
sustained. The Due Process Clause does not 
disregard vital differences. 
Id. at 337. 
The four dissenting Justices were even more adamant. 
Justice Black recoiled at the possible implications of the 
majority's holding: 
[T]he opinion could readily be applied to 
sanction a grant of similar power to every 
state trooper, policeman, sheriff, marshal, 
constable, FBI agent, prosecuting attorney, 
immigration official, narcotics agent, 
health officer, sanitation inspector, 
building inspector, tax collector, customs 
officer and to all the other countless state 
and federal officials who have authority to 
investigate violations of the law. I 
believe that the majority opinion offers a 
completely novel and extremely dangerous 
precedent—one that could be used to destroy 
a society of liberty under law and to 
establish in its place authoritarian 
government. 
Id. at 350-1 (emphasis added). 
If they do not condemn a secret investigation 
conducted by a prosecutor as per se unconstitutional, the six 
concurring and dissenting Justices in Groban at the very least 
recognize a vast difference between vesting investigatory 
powers in law enforcement officials, as opposed to those who 
perform a fact-finding function. The Constitution requires 
greater procedural safeguards to protect fundamental rights 
when citizens are investigated by a prosecutor. 
The United States Supreme Court again expressed the 
critical constitutional difference between granting powers of 
investigation to a fact-finding body and a prosecutor in 
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969). In Jenkins, the 
Court held that individuals interrogated by a commission 
created under Louisiana law to investigate criminal violations 
in the field of labor-management relations were entitled to 
basic due process protections because of the accusatory 
function performed by the commission- The Court distinguished 
the case from Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (I960), where the 
investigative body at issue performed a purely 
information-gathering function, and cited the following 
language from Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in 
Hannah s 
"Were the [Civil Rights] Commission 
exercising an accusatory function, were its 
duty to find that named individuals were 
responsible for wrongful deprivation of 
voting rights and to advertise such finding 
or to serve as part of the process of 
criminal prosecution, the rigorous 
protections relevant to criminal 
prosecutions might well be the controlling 
starting point for assessing the protection 
which the Commission's procedure provides." 
Jenkins, 395 U.S. at 428 (quoting Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 
420, 488 (I960)). In short, the Court found that because the 
Louisiana commission in Jenkins performed the functions of a 
prosecutor, and was not a mere fact-finder, that due process 
required the imposition of greater procedural safeguards. 
3. The Constitution Requires More Stringent 
Procedural Safeguards to Control Investigative Power 
Granted to a Prosecutor. 
The foregoing authorities compel the conclusion that a 
prosecutor conducting an investigation is different in kind 
than a grand jury or administrative agency doing the same 
thing. A prosecutor obviously cannot act as a buffer between 
himself and the public, like a grand jury; nor does he serve a 
simple fact-finding function. Instead, by definition, a 
prosecutor is an adversary of the accused with the sworn duty 
to act zealously in the public interest to obtain convictions. 
Due to this vital law enforcement role of the prosecutor, 
greater procedural safeguards are constitutionally mandated to 
keep his power in check. 
Respondents would not go so far as to say that any 
grant of investigative power to the prosecutor violates due 
process, however. Respondents submit that the Subpoena Act 
would be rendered constitutional if it simply provided for 
prior judicial approval of each subpoena sought to be served by 
the prosecutor. This vital protection has been incorporated 
into the statutes of other states that grant subpoena power to 
the prosecutor. See Iowa Code, § 813.2, Rule 5(6) (1979); Kan. 
Stat. Ann., § 22-3101 (1981); La. Rev. Stat. Ann., Art. 66 
(West Supp. 1984); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-4-304 (1983). 
Significantly, the 1971 version of the Subpoena Act provided 
for prior judicial approval of subpoenas, but this important 
safeguard was removed in 1980 without discussion, during a busy 
budget session. See Addendum IV (legislative history of 1971 
predecessor to Subpoena Act and 1980 revision). 
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In addition, the Subpoena Act should at least 
incorporate the safeguards that now exist under Utah law to 
protect the rights of grand jury witnesses, the right to be 
advised whether one is a target, and the right to be advised of 
one's privilege against self-incrimination. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-11-3(2) (1982). 
B. The Subpoena Act Unconstitutionally Authorizes the 
Prosecutor to Conduct Public Trials Without Providing 
Any Safeguards to Protect Individuals Under 
Investigation" 
Although the criminal investigation before this court 
has been conducted in secret, secrecy is not required by the 
Subpoena Act* The decision to conduct a secret investigation 
is entirely in the discretion of the prosecutor. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-22-2(3) (1982) provides in relevant part that: 
The Attorney General or any county 
attorney may make written application to any 
district court and the court may order that 
interrogation of any witness shall be held 
in secret; that such proceeding be secret; 
and that the record of testimony be kept 
secret unless and until the court for good 
cause otherwise orders. (emphasis added). 
Thus, the Subpoena Act expressly authorizes prosecutors to 
conduct their investigations publicly. 
It takes little imagination to envision the phenomenal 
abuse resulting if the prosecutor, in his discretion, were to 
make his investigations public. Anyone who, in the 
prosecutor's judgment, might "know something relevant to the 
subject of an authorized inquiry could be questioned at length 
concerning that matter. Unlike grand jury investigations 
which, for anciently recognized reasons, are conducted in 
secrecy, the Subpoena Act would authorize the prosecutor to 
conduct the same type of investigation in public. The press 
could, and no doubt would, be invited, and reputations could be 
destroyed. 
In practice it would permit the prosecutor to conduct 
public trials without probable cause to believe a crime has 
been committed. Instead, the prosecutor's "judgment" would be 
sufficient to interrogate a witness in public. The Subpoena 
Act permits this type of interrogation and at the same time 
denies a witness any right to defend himself or present 
evidence in his behalf, thus failing to provide due process 
guarantees recognized by the Supreme Court in Jenkins v. 
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969). 
^
n
 Jenkins/ as discussed supra, the Supreme Court 
considered the constitutional implications of a special 
commission created under Louisiana law whose purpose was "the 
investigation and findings of facts relating to violations or 
possible violations of criminal laws of the state of Louisiana 
or of the United States arising out of or in connection with 
matters in the field of labor-management relations." j[d. at 
414. Under the Louisiana Act, the Commission's investigations 
could be held in public. The Commission itself had no 
authority to make an adjudication of criminality, but was 
authorized to make findings and recommendations to the Attorney 
General. 
Despite the fact that the Commission exercised an 
exclusively investigatory function, the Court nonetheless found 
that a witness interrogated by the Commission was entitled to 
basic due process rights: 
It is true . . . that the Commission does 
not adjudicate in the sense that a court 
does, nor does the Commission conduct, 
strictly speaking, a criminal proceeding. 
Nevertheless, the Act, when analyzed in 
light of the allegations of the complaint, 
makes it clear that the Commission exercises 
a function very much akin to making an 
official adjudication of criminal 
culpability. ~ I [It] is empowered to be 
used and allegedly is used to find name? 
individuals guilty of violating the criminal 
laws of Louisiana and the United States and 
to brand them as criminals in public. 
Id. at 427-8 (emphasis added). 
The Court held that because, by conducting public 
investigations, "the Commission exercises a function very much 
akin to making an official adjudication of criminal 
culpability, • . . " (even though it had no authority to 
convict), that due process requires that an individual under 
investigation by the Louisiana Commission was entitled to 
cross-examine witnesses and present evidence on his own 
behalf. Id. at 428-9. 
The Subpoena Act could potentially be applied in 
precisely the same manner as the statute at issue in Jenkins. 
The prosecutor, to expose violations of the criminal laws, is 
empowered to subpoena and interrogate witnesses in public. 
Even though no determination of criminality may be made 
pursuant to the investigation, under Jenkins a witness 
interrogated in public is entitled to present his own evidence 
and cross-examine witnesses against him. The Subpoena Act's 
failure to provide these protections alone renders it 
unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, because the Subpoena Act provides no 
protection whatsoever to permit an individual interrogated in 
such a manner to clear his name, the individual's reputation, a 
protected "liberty" interest, may effectively be ruined by a 
prosecutor with an axe to grind, without due process of law. 
See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). 
Although no prosecutor has yet used the Subpoena Act in this 
manner, if it is upheld there is no guarantee this would not 
happen in the future. 
IV. THE SUBPOENA ACT IS VOID ON ITS FACE FOR VAGUENESS. 
Judge Bunnell below held the Subpoena Act 
unconstitutional for a number of reasons, but in part because 
he "concluded that the Subpoena Act is too vague . . . ." 
Decision at 4. The Attorney General dismisses the vagueness 
concept summarily: "Vagueness is an inappropriate way to 
characterize any perceived problem with the statute.11 A.G.'s 
Br. at 40. The Attorney General then discusses at length what, 
in his view, Judge Bunnell really meant when he referred to the 
statute's vagueness. 
Respondents submit that Judge Bunnell knew exactly 
what he was talking about when he found the statute too vague. 
He agreed with respondents' contention asserted below that a 
statute is unconstitutionally vague when it fails to "establish 
minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement." Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 909 (1983). 
Kolender involved a challenge to the facial validity 
of a California criminal statute requiring a person stopped by 
the police to provide "credible and reliable" identification. 
Under the statute, a person failing to provide the police with 
"credible and reliable" identification could be arrested. The 
petitioner in Kolender asserted that the statute, by failing to 
more specifically define what identification would be "credible 
and reliable", granted an impermissible degree of discretion to 
law enforcement officials, and was therefore unconstitutionally 
vague under the due process clause. 
The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 opinion authored by 
Justice O'Connor, agreed. The Court noted that "[a]s generally 
stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal 
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct 
is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.11 75 L. Ed. 2d at 909. This is 
apparently the only strand of the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
the Attorney General considered in his contention that 
" [v]agueness is an inappropriate way to characterize any 
perceived problem with the statute." 
As the Supreme Court notes in Kolender, however, the 
doctrine has broader implications: 
Although the doctrine focuses both on actual 
notice to citizens and arbitrary 
enforcement, we have recognized recently 
that the more important aspect of vagueness 
[sic] doctrine "is not actual notice, but 
the other principal element of the doctrine 
- the requirement that a legislature 
establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement." (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 414 
U.S. 566, 574 (1974)). Where the 
legislature fails to provide such minimum 
guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a 
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, 
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their 
personal predilections." (quoting Smith, 
supra, at 475). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Applying the foregoing principles to the statute 
before it, the Court found that it: 
contains no standard for determining what a 
suspect has to do in order to satisfy the 
requirement to prove a "credible and 
reliable11 identification. As such, the 
statute vests virtually complete discretion 
in the hands of the police to determine 
whether the suspect has satisfied the 
statute . . . . An individual • . • is 
entitled to continue to walk the public 
streets "only at the whim of any police 
officer" who happens to stop that individual 
. . . . (Citations omitted). 
Id. 
In short, because the statute before it failed to 
"establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement" and 
thus "vest[ed] virtually complete discretion in the hands of 
the police", the Court held was that it was void-for-vagueness 
and contravened the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Accord Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566# 574-75 (1974). 
For reasons similar to the rationale of the Supreme 
Court in Kolender, this court has invalidated a statute 
creating a governmental authority but which failed to prescribe 
the authority's territorial boundaries and set no definite 
standards or limitations on the authority granted. Great Salt 
Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 
504, 505 (1966). 
The Subpoena Act, like the statute in Kolender, vests 
virtually complete discretion in the hands of law enforcement, 
and fails to establish minimum guidelines to govern their 
conduct. The Subpoena Act wholly fails the Kolender "minimal 
guidelines" test because it permits the prosecutor to require 
the production of documents and other items "which constitute 
evidence which may be relevant to the investigation in the 
judgment of the attorney general or the county attorney." 
(emphasis added). The Subpoena Act fails to answer, however, 
how and within what parameters the judgment of the attorney 
general or county attorney must be exercised. The Subpoena Act 
supplies no guidance or standard whatever for the exercise of 
such extraordinary power. 
It is thus vulnerable, like the statute in Kolender, 
because it permits the prosecutor to determine at his whim what 
may be relevant to the court-authorized investigation. Due to 
the vast discretion conferred, the Subpoena Act indeed 
"furnishes a convenient tool for 'harsh and discriminatory 
enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular 
groups who merit their displeasure.'(citations omitted)". 
Kolender, id. at 911. 
The Subpoena Actfs secrecy provisions are likewise 
unconstitutionally vague. The Act provides that if requested 
by the prosecutor, the district court "may order that 
interrogation of any witness shall be held in secret; that such 
proceeding be secret; and that the record of testimony be kept 
secret unless and until the court for good cause otherwise 
orders." Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-3(3) (1982). The Act 
completely fails to specify, however, what it means "that such 
proceeding be secret/' 
The Attorney General has apparently already 
interpreted and applied this vague language in a way that 
impinges on fundamental rights. Toward the end of the 
deposition of Darcie H. White, Assistant Attorney General Olsen 
admonished the witness as follows: "I would just remind you 
that the proceedings here, the questions, etc., are secret. 
They certainly may be discussed with Mr. Nebeker, but not with 
others.11 See Addendum II. 
Mr. Nebeker then took issue with the Attorney 
General's view of the secrecy provision, indicating he did not 
interpret the statute to prevent the witness from discussing 
3 
his deposition with others. Id. 
At best, the Act's secrecy provisions fail to set out 
with sufficient clarity whether the secret nature of the 
proceedings prevents a witness from discussing his deposition 
with others afterwards. Unlike the Utah grand jury statute, 
which states explicitly that no one "may disclose or be 
* Assistant Attorney General Dallimore expressed 
the following interpretation of the secrecy provision: "Well, 
Steve, I think, at a minimum, it would be better for everyone 
concerned if a lot of people didn't do a lot of talking to each 
other about these proceedings and, specifically, of course, if 
Mr. Fletcher called you on the phone, don't you think it would 
be more appropriate that it not be discussed?" Id. at 164. 
compelled to disclose what he or any grand juror or other 
person may have said'1 during a grand jury proceeding, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-11-10(1) (1982), the Subpoena Act fails to set forth 
any guidelines in this regard. Particularly where, as here, 
the Act's vagueness is subject to an interpretation by the 
Attorney General that potentially impinges on the First 
Amendment right of free speech of interrogated witnesses, the 
statute must be declared unconstitutionally void for vagueness. 
Finally, the Subpoena Act is unconstitutionally vague 
because it fails to establish minimal guidelines with respect 
to the constitutionally required procedural safeguards to be 
afforded a witness to an investigation. While the Attorney 
General contends that the self-incrimination and target 
warnings required by this Court in State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 
216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967) in the grand jury context, may also be 
implied in the language of the Subpoena Act (A.G.'s Br. at 
37-40), the fact is the required warnings are absent from the 
statute and the Attorney General has hitherto refused to give 
them. See Addendum II, Excerpts from Darcie White Deposition 
at 4-6. In fact, the Attorney General argues that Ruggeri 
warnings are not required under the Subpoena Act at all. 
A.G.'s Br. at 27-35. Thus, the Attorney General's own analysis 
and application of the Subpoena Act leads to the conclusion 
that the statute is too ambiguous to adequately guide the 
Attorney General, who is only one of thirty prosecutorial 
bodies empowered to conduct criminal investigations. 
V. IT IS NOT A JUDICIAL FUNCTION TO REWRITE A STATUTE BY 
INTERPRETATION. 
It is a well established rule that legislative 
enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity 
and that statutes should not be declared unconstitutional if 
there is any reasonable basis upon which they can be found to 
come within the constitutional framework. Greaves v. State, 
528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974). However, this presumption of 
validity is a rebuttable one. Courts are under a duty to say 
what the law is; even if that means rendering void a statute 
passed by the legislature. 
Where a statute affects or may encroach upon 
fundamental personal liberties, a stricter judicial scrutiny is 
required and the presumption of validity is more easily 
overcome. This court has recognized this limitation on the 
presumptive validity of statutes on several occasions. In Re 
Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981); Allen v. Trueman, 37 Utah 
528, 110 P.2d 356 (1941). 
The Utah Court in Greaves v. State, supra, while 
upholding a statute in the face of a vagueness challenge, also 
noted that the focus in such a challenge must be on the 
language of a statute: 
A statute will not be declared unconstitutional 
• . . if under any sensible interpretation of 
its language it can be given practical effect, 
(emphasis added.) 
Id. at 807. In the case at hand, it is the absence of language 
that constitutes the Subpoena Actfs fatal flaw. 
Judge Bunnell in his May 30, 1984 order read into the 
Subpoena Act a requirement of target and self incrimination 
warnings. See Addendum III. The Attorney General says these 
warnings, if required, may be incorporated into the statute by 
implication or interpretation. A.G. Br. at 37-40. Such an 
implication or interpretation finds no basis in the language of 
the statute. 
Unless statutory language is ambiguous, a court may 
not supply through interpretation a statutory omission without 
transcending the judicial function. Park v. Edgewater, Inc. v. 
Joy, 416 N.Y.S.2d 266, 68 A.D.2d 107 (1979). It is not the 
province of the Court to draft legislation. Interstate Circuit 
v, Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968). "The absence of narrowly 
drawn, and reasonable and definite standards for the officials 
to follow (citations omitted) is fatal." Ld. See also United 
States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943). 
This court has also recognized that supplying omitted 
language or otherwise rewriting a statute in an effort to 
validate it is not an appropriate judicial function. In 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, 107 Utah 530, 155 P.2d 184 (1945), this court 
observed "the interpretation must be based on the language 
used, and . . . the court has no power to rewrite a statute to 
make it conform to an intention not expressed." 155 P.2d at 
185. 
The foregoing decisions are founded on the principles 
underlying the American system of tri-partite government. It 
is the judicial function to apply and interpret the law. It is 
the province of the legislature to make the law. Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); Calhoun County v. Galbraith, 99 
U.S. 214 (1878). It is the legislature's prerogative to 
establish those standards necessary to bring prosecutorial 
subpoena power in line with the Constitution. 
The Attorney General argues that the courts may supply 
procedures omitted by the legislature, and cites In Re 
Barnett's Estate, 275 P. 453 (Cal. 1929) for the concept that a 
court cannot supply omissions in a statute which are of a 
substantive nature, but may supply procedures. A.G.'s Br., 
p. 37. Respondents submit that the constitutional right to a 
Miranda warning is a substantive right, and not merely a 
procedure. The Attorney General says that the courts in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and State v. Ruggeri, 
19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967) are excellent examples of a 
procedure being implied into a statute. In each of those cases 
the lawfulness of a statute was not at issue, rather it was the 
safeguards provided in police interrogation, on one hand, and 
the grand jury on the other. It is notable that shortly 
following the Ruggeri decision, the Utah legislature enacted 
the safeguards required therein. Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-3 
(1982). It is not the judicial function for a court to rewrite 
the Subpoena Act to incorporate substantive judicial safeguards 
which the legislature failed to include. 
VI. THE SUBPOENA ACT SHOULD BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON 
ITS FACE. 
Although the Subpoena Act has been abused, and in 
Judge Bunnell's words, "allows for an absolute abuse of power,11 
and although the Attorney General apparently concedes it has 
resulted in the violation of Fourth Amendment rights, see 
A.G.'s Br. at 39, the Attorney General argues that this is no 
reason to hold the statute unconstitutional on its face. The 
Attorney General takes refuge in his view that the power 
granted prosecutors by the Subpoena Act should be treated just 
like the power conferred on law enforcement officers generally 
to obtain a search warrant, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-23-1 et se%. (1982): 
[T]he remedy for the single violation of a 
citizen's Fourth Amendment right is not a 
ruling that the Act under which the 
violation occurred is unconstitutional. 
Instead, it is the suppression of evidence, 
if the violation is substantial and not in 
good faith, § 77-35-12(g), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
A.G.'s Br. at 39. 
The Attorney General argues, with some persuasiveness, 
that a statute conferring authority on governmental officials 
should not automatically be held unconstitutional simply 
because it may, in certain circumstances, result in the 
violation of constitutional rights. Clearly, the government 
must have authority to conduct searches and make arrests, and 
cannot be denied this authority altogether simply because, in 
some circumstances, it may do these things in an 
unconstitutional manner. 
A. Unlike the Search Warrant Statute, the Subpoena Act 
Requires No Prior Judicial Approval of Subpoenas 
Issued Under Its Authority. 
By simply likening the Subpoena Act to the search 
warrant statute, however, the Attorney General glosses over 
significant differences between those statutes. First, a 
search warrant cannot be issued unless probable cause is first 
demonstrated to an impartial magistrate. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-23-1, et seq. (1982). The statutorily required need for 
prior judicial authorization to conduct a search greatly 
diminishes the possibility of constitutional violations 
perpetrated under the search warrant statute. 
B
* The Subpoena Act Contains No Effective Deterrent 
Against Its Improper Application. 
Secondly, the remedy of exclusion of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence, while it may provide an effective deterrent 
to unconstitutional searches, provides no effective deterrent 
to the "fishing expedition" sanctioned under the Subpoena Act. 
Under Utah's statutory enactment of the "exclusionary rule", 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(g) (1982), an effective deterrent 
exists to prevent police investigating discrete criminal 
conduct from conducting a search without first obtaining a 
warrant from a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. 
The specific evidence of the suspected crime under 
investigation may not be usable if the statutory procedures are 
not followed. 
It is far from clear, however, that this statute would 
ever deter a prosecutor, interested in roaming the files and 
records of a Utah citizen from doing so. While the police most 
often use the search warrant statute to find evidence of 
specific criminal conduct, a prosecutor is more apt to use the 
Subpoena Act to find evidence of criminality that was 
previously unsuspected. The exclusionary rule is not an 
effective deterrent to this type of abuse. 
C. The Subpoena Act Encourages Prosecutors to Use It 
Improperly. 
Finally, and most importantly, the Subpoena Act should 
not be upheld because, although it may be possible to apply it 
constitutionally, the very language and structure of the 
Subpoena Act encourages the prosecutor to apply it in an 
abusive and unconstitutional way. It should therefore be 
declared unconstitutional on its face. This is a practical 
necessity especially when 29 county attorneys are vested with 
the powers of the Subpoena Act along with the Attorney General. 
It may not be appropriate in every case to declare a 
statute facially unconstitutional simply because some of the 
applications contemplated within its language may impinge on 
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 613 (1973). However, the United States Supreme Court 
has held that a statute should be held facially 
unconstitutional if it reaches Ma substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct." Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982). Applying this principle, 
the Court in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 
(1983), discussed at length in Part IV supra, impelled by its 
concern that "the statute vests virtually complete discretion 
in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has 
satisfied the statute," i_d. at 909, did not hesitate to declare 
the statute facially unconstitutional, even though the statute 
at issue there clearly had several constitutional 
applications. See id. at 910, n. 8. 
Respondents submit that the statute here, like the 
statute in Kolender, should be declared unconstitutional on its 
face. Not only, due to the vast discretion it confers, does 
the statute reach "a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct," Hoffman, supra at 494, it literally 
encourages the prosecutor to exploit it in an abusive and 
unconstitutional manner. The Subpoena Act vests a vaguely 
defined and far-reaching power of investigation in thirty 
prosecutors, each with a sworn duty to obtain convictions and 
put people in jail. In their zeal to fulfill this function, 
all of these prosecutors cannot reasonably be expected to apply 
it in a way that safeguards constitutional rights. 
If the statute is not declared facially 
unconstitutional, the court is virtually inviting the 
prosecutor to continue to use the statute in the manner it has 
been applied already, with little regard for constitutional 
boundaries. Where a statute has been applied 
unconstitutionally, and further invites and encourages such 
unconstitutional application, respondents submit it must be 
declared invalid on its face. 
VII. THE SUBPOENA ACT RUNS AFOUL OF THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE. 
As more fully discussed in the record below, the 
Subpoena Act is not of recent vintage. Rather, the Subpoena 
Act is a revision of a former statute enacted in 1971 (codified 
in Chapter 45 of Title 77 as §§ 19, 20 and 21, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) (the "Former Act"). See Addendum I at iv. Under the 
Former Act, a prosecutor could not issue a subpoena without 
obtaining prior approval of the district court. .Id. This 
judicial restraint was imposed on prosecuting attorneys by the 
1971 Legislature for the purpose of avoiding a constitutional 
attack similar to the ones made in the case at bar. Addendum 
IV at xlii-xlv, xlvii-1. It was eliminated from the Subpoena 
Act in the 1980 budget session of the legislature as part of 
the recodification of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. Id., 
at lix-lxxxiv. 
A review of the legislature debates surrounding the 
Former Act indicates that judicial approval of subpoenas was 
deemed an essential constitutional safeguard in the minds of 
the 1971 Legislature. No mention was made of the removal of 
this procedure during the 1980 budget session at which time the 
Subpoena Act was enacted. Rather, legislators urged the 
passage of the bill containing the Subpoena Act with the 
warning that "[t]he Bill's not perfect . . . but the need to 
have this occur is so great and we are so hamstrung now with 
the confusion regarding the rules of the game . . . " that its 
passage is required. Id., at lx. 
The Subpoena Act violates the "one-subject rule" found 
in Article VI, § 22 of the Utah Constitution which requires 
that, except for bills providing for the codification and 
general revision of laws, "no bill shall be passed containing 
more than one subject . . . " Contrary to the 
characterizations of the 1980 legislators, the Subpoena Act is 
not a codification of laws. Where a statute, such as the 
Former Act, is codified or recodified, it is presumed to be 
enacted without change, even though it is reworded and 
rephrased. See, e.g., C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction, § 28.10 at 327 (1972). The Subpoena Act contains 
numerous changes from the Former Act and is thus not excluded 
from the application of the one-subject rule as a codification. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, respondents Karl J. 
Stott, Norman Maxfield, and Orrin T. Colby, Jr., respectfully 
request this Court to affirm the district court's decision 
holding the Subpoena Act unconstitutional. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 ^ day of February, 
1985. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK, & MpDONOUGH 
By: 
Dbnald B. y&olbrook 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Karl J. Stott, Norman Maxfield, 




United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when 
in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
casesc In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
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testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
SUBPOENA ACT 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 77-22-1 through 77-22-3 
77-22-1. Declaration of necessity. It is 
declared, as a matter of legislative determination, 
that it is necessary to grant subpoena powers in aid 
of criminal investigations and to provide a method of 
keeping information gained from investigations secret 
both to protect the innocent and to prevent criminal 
suspects from having access to information prior to 
prosecution and to clarify the power of the attorney 
general and county attorneys to grant immunity from 
prosecution to witnesses whose testimony is essential 
to the proper conduct of a criminal investigation or 
prosecution. 
77-22-2. Right to subpoena witnesses and require 
production of evidence — Contents of subpoena 
Interrogation before closed court. (1) In any matter 
involving the investigation of a crime, the existence 
of a crime or malfeasance in office or any criminal 
conspiracy or activity, the attorney general or any 
county attorney shall have the right, upon application 
and approval of the district court, for good cause 
shown, to conduct an investigation in which the 
prosecutor may subpoena witnesses, compel their 
attendance and testimony under oath before any 
certified court reporter, and require the production 
of books, papers, documents, recordings and any other 
items which constitute evidence or may be relevant to 
the investigation in the judgment of the attorney 
general or county attorney. 
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(2) The subpoena need not disclose the names of 
possible defendants and need only contain notification 
that the testimony of the witness is sought in aid of 
criminal investigation and state the time and place of 
the examination/ which may be conducted anywhere 
within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor issuing the 
subpoena, and inform the party served that he is 
entitled to be represented by counsel. Witness fees 
and expenses shall be paid as in a civil action. 
(3) The attorney general or any county attorney 
may take written application to any district court and 
the court may order that interrogation of any witness 
shall be held in secret; that such proceeding be 
secret; and that the record of testimony be kept 
secret unless and until the court for good cause 
otherwise orders. The court may order excluded from 
any investigative hearing or proceeding any persons 
except the attorneys representing the state and 
members of their staffs, the court reporter and the 
attorney for the witness. 
77-22-3. Immunity granted to witness — Refusal 
of witness to testify or produce evidence — Powers 
granted prosecuting attorneys in addition to other 
powers. In any investigation or prosecution of a 
criminal case, the attorney general and any county 
attorney shall have the power to grant transactional 
immunity from prosecution to any person who is called 
or who is intended to be called as a witness in behalf 
of the state whenever the attorney general or county 
attorney deems that the testimony of such persons is 
necessary to the investigation or prosecution of such 
a case. No prosecution shall be instituted against 
the person for any crime disclosed by his testimony 
which is privileged under this action, provided that 
should the person testify falsely, nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to prevent prosecution 
for perjury. 
If during the investigation or prosecution a 
person refuses to answer a question or produce 
evidence of any kind on the ground that he may be 
incriminated thereby, the attorney issuing the 
subpoena may file a request in writing with the 
district court in which the examination is being 
conducted for an order requiring that person to answer 
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the question or produce the evidence requested. The 
court shall set a time for hearing and order the 
person to appear before the court to show cause, if 
any he has, why the question should not be answered or 
the evidence produced, and the court shall order the 
question answered or the evidence practiced unless it 
finds that to do so would be clearly contrary to the 
public interest, or could subject the witness to a 
criminal prosecution in another jurisdiction. If the 
witness still refuses to answer or produce the 
evidence, he shall be guilty of contempt of court and 
punished accordingly. If the witness complies with 
the order and he would have been privileged to 
withhold the answer given or the evidence produced by 
him except for this section, that person shall not be 
prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture on 
account of any fact or act concerning which, he was 
ordered to answer or produce evidence except he may 
nevertheless be prosecuted or subjected to penalty for 
any perjury, false swearing or contempt committed in 
answering, failing to answer, or for producing or 
failing to produce any evidence in accordance with the 
order. 
The powers specified in this chapter are in 
addition to any other powers granted to the attorney 
general or county attorneys. 
FORMER SUBOPENA ACT EFFECTIVE 1971 
Section 1. Purpose — Subpoena Powers. 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative 
determination that there has been a marked increase in 
crime and criminal activity within this state, and 
that in order to protect the public health, safety, 
and morals, it is necessary to grant subpoena powers 
in aid of criminal investigations conducted by the 
attorney general, district attorneys and county 
attorneys, and to provide a method of keeping 
information gained from investigations secret both to 
protect the innocent and to prevent criminal suspects 
from having access to information prior to prosecution 
to the detriment of the proper enforcement of the 
criminal laws of this state, and to clarify the power 
of the attorney general, district attorneys, and 
county attorneys to grant immunity from prosecution of 
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witnesses whose testimony is essential to the proper 
conduct of an investigation of criminal activities and 
prosecution of crimes committed within this state. 
Section 2. Subpoena Powers — Procedural Requisites 
— Court Procedure, 
In any matter involving the investigation of a 
crime, the existence of a crime, or any criminal 
conspiracy or activity, the attorney general, any 
district attorney or any county attorney shall have 
the right, upon application and approval of the 
district court for good cause shown, to subpoena 
witnesses, compel their attendance and testimony under 
oath before any certified court reporter, and require 
the production of books, papers, documents, records 
and other tangible items which constitute or may 
contain evidence which is or may be relevant or 
material to the investigation in the judgment of the 
attorney general, district attorney or county attorney. 
The subpoena need not disclose the name or names-
of possible defendants and need only contain 
notification that the testimony of the witness is 
sought in aid of a criminal investigation and state 
the time and place of the examination, which may be 
conducted anywhere within the jurisdiction of the 
attorney issuing the subpoena, and inform the party 
served that he is entitled to be represented by 
counsel. V7itness fees and expenses shall be tendered 
and paid as in any civil action. 
In addition to the foregoing rights and powers to 
compel attendance and obtain evidence, the attorney 
general, any district attorney, or any county attorney 
may make written application to any district court and 
the court may order that interrogation of any witness 
shall be before a closed court; that such proceeding 
be secret; and that the record of such testimony be 
kept secret unless and until the court for good cause 
otherwise orders. The court shall have the power to 
exclude from any investigative hearing or proceeding, 
any and all persons except the attorneys representing 
the state and members of their staffs, the court 
reporter, and the attorney for the witness. 
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GRAND JURY STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-11-3 
77-11-3. Evidence receivable - Witness to be 
advised of rights. (1) The grand jury shall receive 
no other evidence than is given by witnesses under 
oath or affirmation, or documentary evidence, or the 
deposition of a witness taken as provided by law. The 
grand jury shall receive only legal evidence. 
(2) Any person called to testify before the 
grand jury may be advised of his right to be 
represented by counsel. If a witness is or becomes a 
subject of the investigation, he shall be advised of 
that fact and of his right to counsel, and of his 
privilege against self incrimination. On demand of a 
witness for representation by counsel, the proceedings 
shall be delayed until counsel is present. In the 
event that counsel of the witness* choice is not 
available, he shall be required to obtain or accept 
other counsel. 
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DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
STANLEY H. OLSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 34114 
Telephone: (801) 533-7626 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 0? EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF A : SUBr-OSNA DUCES TECUM 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION : C3 NO. I 
THE STATE 0? UTAH TO: 
Crrin T. Colby 
14C7 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411-5 335-4040 
You are hereby commanded to set a^ide ail business 
and excuses and appear at the Office of ':he Attorney General 
of the State of Utah, 236 State Capitol, Salt Laics City, 
Utah, at the hour of -' -'^  -> .m. , on :^•=«'* - the 
A ,• fU A J i - day of i'^J/i i 1984, to give testimony 
J 
in support of a criminal investigation. You are entitled to 
be represented by legal counsel. 
f."~«fl •S*??. 
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You are also commanded to bring with you any and 
all books, records, documents, accounts, or papers 
pertaining to Utah Power and Light to include, but not be 
limited to: information and documentation regarding all 
uranium properties purchased, controlled and managed by Utah 
Power and Light; a detailed reconciliation of all changes in 
balances for all uranium properties as reflected in reports 
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for the years 
1979 and 1930 to include all of the detailed documentation 
(vouchers, checks, etc*) reflecting and supporting reported 
increases in balances for ail uranium properties from 1979 
to 1930. 
This subpoena duces tecum is authorized by order 
of the District Court. Disobedience to this order is 
punishable by contempt of Court* 
it 
Given under my hand this -tU day of April, 1934. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
By: ^ q ^ / . U , ry/y^2_^-
STANLEY) H. OLSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
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DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
STANLEY H. OLSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 34114 
Telephone: (801) 533-7626 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 0? EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF A 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
CS NO. 1 
THE STATS OF UTAH TO: 
Norman Maxfield 
1407 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
You are hereby commanded to set aside all business 
and excuses and appear at the Office of the Attorney General 
of the State of Utah, 235 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, at the hour of #'*&<&• .a.. on ^rrir(&^ the 
12, 4, day of A?"/ ., 1984, to give testimony 
in support of a criminal investigation. You are entitled to 
be represented by legal counsel. 
ix 
You are also commanded to bring with you any and 
all books, records, documents, accounts, or papers 
pertaining to Mike Thompson, Mike Ziemski, Bruce Conklin, et 
al., MTA.Vanguard, Great Basin Patrol, and L. Brent 
Fletcher. 
This subpoena duces tecum is authorized by order 
of the District Court. Disobedience to this order is 
punishable by contempt of Court. 
Given under my hand this ^W^ day of April; 1984. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
A tiA am 
STANLEY|H. OLSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
PAUL H. WARNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Litigation Division 
STANLEY H. OLSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34114 
Telephone; (301) 533-7625 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF A 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
CS NO. 1 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: 
Karl J.Stott 
1407 West North Tesiple 
Salt Mice City, Utah 84115 525-2823 
You ara hereby camaanded co sat aside all business 
and excuses and appear at the Office of the Attorney General 
of the State of Utah, 235 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, at the hour of-
•4. 
^W- day of M l 
. m,,. on 
/'-V5c^ _, 
., the 
., 1984, to give testimony 
in support of a criminal investigation. You are entitled to 
be represented by legal counsel. 
You are also commanded to bring with you any and 
all books, records, documents, accounts, or papers 
pertaining to Utah Power and Light to include, but not be 
limited to: information and documentation regarding all 
uranium properties purcnased? controlled and managed by Utah 
Power and Light; a detailed reconciliation of ail changes in 
balances for all uranium properties as reflected in reports 
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for the years 
1373 and 1980 to include all of the detailed documentation 
(vouchers, checks, etc*) reflecting and supporting reported 
increases in balances for ail uranium properties from 1379 
to 1S80. 
This subpoena duces tecum is authorised by order 
of the District Court. Disobedience to this order is 
punishable by contempt of Court. 
Given under my hand this U+\ day of April, 1934 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Assistanc Attorney General 
Chigt, Litigation Division 
By: A MlM 
STANLSya. OLSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
Darcie White Deposition 
IN THE MATTER OF A 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-OOo-
: Case No. CS No. 1 
: Deposition of: 
: DARCIE H. WHITE 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3rd day of April, 1984, 
the deposition of DARCIE H. WHITE, produced as a witness 
herein at the instance of the Attorney Generalfs office, 
in the above-entitled action now pending in the above-named 
Court, was taken before Rashell Garcia, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
commencing at the hour of 9; 00 a.m. of said day, at the 
offices of the Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, State of Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Subpoena, 







1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
«*lt I *!<• Citu Utah 84111 
801-322-1029 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Attorney 
General's Office: 
For the Witness 
STANLEY H. OLSEN 
SUZANNE DALLIMORE 
Assistant Attorney Generals 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
WAYNE WICKIZER 
Special Investigator 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
STEPHEN NEBEKER 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
MS. OLSEN: This is the time set for the deposition) 
of Mr* Darcie White pursuant to a subpoena given to 
Mr. Stephen. Nebeker, his counsel. Steve, you delivered that 
to Mr* White and are here pursuant to that subpoena; is that 
correct? 
MR, NEBEKER: That's correct. 
MR. OLSENt Let me just indicate who is present. 
Steve Nebeker is here reprsenting Mr. Darcie White. Stan 
Olsen from the Attorney General's office, and Ms. Suzanne 
Dallimore -- and why don't you spell that. 
MS. DALLIMORE: D-a-1-l-i-m-o-r-e. 
MR. OLSENs And Wayne Wickizer, investigator with 
the office of the Attorney General. 
Before we went on the record, we had a discussion 
concerning the questioning in this case. For the record, I 
want to indicate that I will be asking the questions to a 
certain point in time, and then at the time when it will be 
my intention to turn the questioning over to either Suzanne 
or Wayne, then I think it would be appropriate at that time 
for us to put on the record our respective positions in that 
regard. Steve, if you have any statement, go ahead. 
MR. NEBEKER: Fine. First of all, I would like to 
ask if in fact this is being conducted pursuant to the 
criminial investigative docket that's been opened up in 
3 
1 Emery County? 
2 MR. OLSEN: It is. 
3 MR. NEBEKER: And the subpoena carried that 
4] designation on it, did it not? 
5 MR. OLSEN: That's my understanding. Is that 
6 correct, Wayne? 
7 MR. WICKIZER: Yes. 
8 MR. NEBEKER: Secondly, I would like to ask you on 
9 the record if in fact Mr. Darcie White who has been subpoenaejd 
10 here is a target in the investigation? 
11 MR. OLSEN: Right. My response to that, as it was 
12 off the record, is that we intend to ask Mr. White a series 
13 of questions concerning his employment and relationships with! 
14 not only his current employer but with previous employees and) 
15 contractors with Utah Power & Light. I don't have a more 
16 specific answer to give than that. 
17 MR. NEBEKER: Can you state more specifically 
18 whether or not he is in fact being considered as a target of 
19 the investigation? 
20 MR. OLSEN: There isn't a way for me to be more 
21 specific than that. I think it is fair to say that as we 
22 continue the investigation, that all persons who we've become; 
23 aware of or interview or depose, that we would review their 
24 depositions or information that we gain about those persons 
25 and review their potential criminal liability. That's as 
1 specific as I'm able to be. 
2 MR. NEBEKER: Well, for the record, I think I would) 
3 say that I donft think that response is adequate because I 
4 think he's entitled to know whether or not he is the subject 
5 of a criminal investigation. I think you should, at this 
6 time, be required to tell him whether or not he is the subjecjt 
7 of the investigation because I think certain questions that 
8 may be put to him may require him to take the Fifth Amendment! 
9 if he deems it necessary. I think he's entitled to know thad 
10 >*R. OLSEN: I understand that concern and I'm being 
11 as candid as I can. I think it's fair to say, Steve, that 
12 if there is a question asked, for example, if he did anything 
13 which we may later look at as being a potential criminal 
14 violation, then we would look at it and review it with a 
15 view to potential prosecution. I'm honestly being as 
16 candid as I can about that. I don't know that we have said 
17 as to any person that we have absolutely eliminated that 
18 specific person.' We have not done, nor, I think, can we 
19 legitimately do that. I'm honestly not holding back anything 
20 there. That's my response and we're not eliminating anyone 
21 at this point« 
22 MR. NEBEKER: Well, if that's all you're willing 
21 to put on the record, then I guess we'll just have to let 
24 the record stand as it is, but my position is that he's 
25 entitled to know that. I think the Attorney General's offic* 
1 should be required to tell him that. 
2 EXAMINATION 
3 BY MR. OLSEN: 
4 Q Mr. White, I wonder if you would give us your full 
5 name and the spelling of each of the names, please. 
5 A Okay, my name is Darcie, D-a-r-c-i-e, middle initiajl 
7 H, White, W-h-i-t-e. 
8 I Q Mr. White, what is your business and home addresses^, 
9 please? 
10 A My business address is 1407 West North Temple, 
11 Salt Lake City. My home address is 2817 Cherry Blossom Lane 
12 in Salt Lake City. 
13 Q Would you give us your telephone numbers as well, 
14 please. 
15 A At the office, my business phone is 535-2460. At 
16 I home, it's 277-9797. 
17 Q Could you give us your date of birth? 
18 A September 20, 1926. 
19 Q If you would, give us the name of your current 
20 employer? 
21 A Utah Power & Light Company. 
22 Q How long have you been employed with Utah Dower & 
23 Light? 
24 A Just short of 34 years, 
25 Q What is your current position? 
also discussed that he had been up here for his deposition. 
Did he express some concern over the deposition and the 
pending investigation? 
A Only the fact that it had taken place. He didn8t 
give me any details or any specific concerns. 
Q Mr* White, did you have -- let me ask it this way: 
Do you have reason or did you, at any time, have reason to 
suspect that Mr. Fletcher may have been benefiting outside 
his UP&L salary from his contractual relationship — from the} 
security contracts that we've discussed during this depositicf 
A I never had any concern about that. 
Q Have you read Mr. Fletcher's deposition that was 
given? Have you read his deposition he gave in this office? 
A No, I have note I only know he told me he had 
given a deposition* 
0 Just a summary question, Mr. White. In terms of 
the negotiation of the initial contract, was its signing 
on your behalf recommended by Mr. Fletcher? 
A The contract was recommended by Mr. Fletcher 
subsequent to a review by our Legal Department that it was 
in the company's interest. I did sign it. 
MR. NEBEKERs It seems to me we've been over this 
a couple of times. 
THE WITNESS.- I think we have* 
Q (By Mr. Olsen) Anyone else other than Mr* Fletcher 
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1 other than the legal people who made the recommendation? 
2 A Well, of course Mr. Fletcher's supervisor recommended 
3 it, also. 
4
 Q Then Mr. Maxfield and Mr. Fletcher recommended its 
5 signing by the company and review by the Legal Department? 
6
 A Yes. 
7
 Q Would that have been true as to the third contract, 
8 then? 
9
 A I don't specifically recall talking to Mr. Maxfieldj 
10 about that, but I'm sure it went through the same process. 
U Q Did Mr. pletcher recommend that? 
12 A He did. 
13 Q Are you familiar with where Mr. Fletcher resides? 
'* A I believe, though I'm not sure, that he lives in 
15 j Bountiful. 
Q Have you been to his home? 
A No. 
Q Mr. White, let me just remind you of something that 
Steve may well have talked to you about, but for purposes of 
making sure that we're clear on this, the proceedings here 







" secrecy order. I would just remind you that the proceedings 
23 
25 
here, the questions, etc., are secret. They certainly may 
24
 be discussed with Mr. Nebeker but not with others. The other 
question I have is — well, let me ask you if you understand 
161 
that. 
MR. NEBEKER: Let me ask you on what authority 
you're telling him that he can't discuss this with anyone? 
MR* OLSEN: Pursuant to the secrecy order,, 
MR. NEBEKER: I didn't see a copy of that-
MR. OLSEN: Well, I guess my question is does he 
understand that --
MR. NEBEKER: Nof he does not understand that. 
THE WITNESS: No, I didn't. 
MR. NEBEKER: We have never been served with a copy 
of that order. . 
MS. DALLIMORE: There's a statute that requires 
that all procedures be kept secret that we take pursuant to 
criminal subpoenaes unless the witness waives his right to 
keep them secrete 
MR. OLSEN: I think we sent you a copy of that 
as well, Steve. 
MR. NEBEKER: The secrecy order? 
MR. OLSEN: Yes. 
MR. NEBEKER: I've never seen it. At least, if 
I have, I don't have it in my file. Is it the order signed 
by Judge Bunnell? 
MR. OLSEN: Yes. 
MRc NEBEKER? The last one he signed? Is that the 




* MR. OLSEN: We're not talking about the deletion 
2 of the name, we're talking about the initial secrecy order, 
3
 a copy of which was supplied to you. I'd be glad to do it 
4
 again. 
^ MR. NEBEKER: Well, I may have really just not seen 
* that but the order that I have here — maybe this is the 
7
 one you're referring to, the one dated January 26, 1983. 
8
 MR. OLSEN: That's the one. 
9
 I M*. NEBEKER: And this is from Judge Bunnell. 
MR. OLSEN: Correct. 
MR. NEBEKER: It says that "hereby orders that the 
12 J proceedings and record in the above-entitled investigation 
'3 I may be kept secret and any and all persons may be excluded 
'* I from access." My understanding is that simply seals the 
file. I don't have any understanding that, for instance, 
Mr. White can speak to anybody besides me as the attorney fori 
the company. I think we better have that understood because} 
he has talked to Mr. Eliason and, in fact, talked to him 
yesterday after the deposition. 
MR. OLSEN: Well, I guess we'll just have to — 
MR. NEBEKER: Are you telling me — 
MR. OLSEN: I guess we'll have to disagree about 
that. 
MR. NEBEKER: Are you saying that this order says 












1 interpreting this? 
2 MR. OLSEN: Well, I think with the exception of 
3 the attorney, that is correct. I don't know what the — 
4 MR. NEBEKER: I just read it entirely different,, 
5 It says "Based upon the above application of Attorney General 
6 and documents on file herein, aood cause appearing: It is 
7 hereby ordered that the proceedings and records in the above-j 
3 entitled investigation mav be secret" — may be secret ~ 
9 "and that any and all nersons may be excluded from access 
10 to any such proceedings or record except the attorneys 
11 representing the State of Utah and members of their staff, 
12 the court reporter that witnessed, and the attorney for the 
13 witness". 
14 MS. DALLIMORE; Well, Steve, I think, at a minimum 
15 it would be better for everyone concerned if a lot of people 
16 didn't do a lot of talking to each other about these 
17 proceedings and, specifically, of course, if Mr. Fletcher 
18 called you on the phone, don't you think it would be more 
19 appropriate that it not be discussed? 
20 MR. NEBEKER: Outside of this court order, which 
21 we understand has been issued by the Court, I guess each 
22 person has to interpret that and if you interpret that as 
23 saying to Mr. White that he can't talk to anyone about this 
24 except me, then I think I need to know that because I don't 
25 — we don't want to violate the Court order but, on the otheif 
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1 hand, I think this simply says that the record and proceeding^ 
2 are to be kept secret. In fact, we have looked at the file 
3 in Emery County and part of it is sealed and part of it is 
4 not sealed, as you're probably aware. 
5 MR. OLSEN: Sure. 
6 MR. NEBEKER: And so all of the file is not even 
7 being kept secret. I'm not sure that these people aren't 
3 entitled at the company to talk to each other. If you're 
9 saying that they cannot do that, maybe we better have an 
JO understanding there, and I think maybe we better find out 
11 from the Judge if that is the way this is to be conducted. 
12 MR. OLSEN: I suppose we can have another conversa-
13 tion with him. 
14 MR. NEBEKER: I mean, I just don't want to get 
15 these peoole in violation of a court order and have them — 
16 for instance, Mr. White talked to Norm Maxfield and then 
17 have you, in effect, say to these people, You shouldn't do 
18 that. If they're not to do it, we better tell them now, 
19 but I have not understood that up until now because I've 
20 talked to Mr. White and I've talked to Mr. Eliason. They 
21 have spoken to each other, merely because they happened to 
22 be here at the same time, one was coming and one was leaving. 
23 MR. OLSEN: Sure, I understand. 
24 MR. NEBEKER: We don't intend to violate the 
25 court order, but we need to have an understanding on the 
165 
1 basic ground rules as to how the investigation is being 
2 conducted. Merely for the sake of protecting these people 
3 and myself as attorney for the company, I think we need to 
4 have that clarified. If I'm wrong, then I certainly could 
5 be corrected by the Judge. 
5 MR. OLSEN: It's something we should perhaps 
7 clarify and we're — 
8 MR. NEBEKER: Let me say he has no way of controlli^i< 
9 if Mr. Fletcher calls him. 
10 MS. DALLIMORE: Certainly not. 
MR. NEBEKER: Or if Mr. Ziemski calls or if 
Mr. Wall calls him. I don't know whether those people — 
what instructions they have been given. Mr. Fletcher himself| 
came back and talked to Mr. White after his deDosition. He 
15 I apparently was not under any concept that he was not to talk 
16 to anyone. So, I merelv state that on the record because I 
17 think it's important for us to know where we stand with 
18 regard to that. I think it is not the intent of Utah Power 
19 & Light or its employees to violate any of the court orders 
20 in connection with this criminal investigation, but I think 
21 we are entitled to know the questions I have already asked 
22 which I think have not been answered as to who is the subjectj 
21 of this investigation and, further, I think we're entitled 
24 to know now that you are claiming that they cannot talk to 







1 MR. OLSEN: Well, I think we have already stated 
2 what our position is on that and if we want to try to reach 
3 the Judge again today, as we did before, we can do that, or 
4 we can try to reach him by conference call at a later time. 
5 MR. NEBEKER: All right. 
5 MR. OLSEN: The only other question I have and, 
7 perhaps you have questions, Steve, but my last question is 
3 to ask whether you have any additional statements or clarifi-] 
9 cations that you would like to make, Mr. White, about what's 
been testified to? 
11 I MR. NEBEKER: In terms of what his testimony has 
12 already been? 
13 MR. OLSEN: Yes. 
14 MR. NEBEKER: Any corrections? 
15 MR. OLSEN: .Any corrections or any other statements] 
lg he would like to make. 
17 MR. NEBEKER: Now, wait a minute. I don't think 
18 it's proper to ask him just to make a statement on the record) 
19 MR. OLSEN: I'm not asking him to. My question 
20 was does he want to make corrections or does he want to make 
21 any other statement. I'm not saying to make a statement, 
22 I'm asking if he wants to, that's all. 
23 MR. NEBEKER: Do you understand what they're saying) 
24 If you have anything you think needs to be corrected, you're 








1 a chance to read your deposition. 
2
 THE WITNESS: Sure. 
3
 MR. NEBEKER: If I understand your question, you're 
* asking him if he wants to make any other comments on question^ 
5 that have been asked, and I'm qoing to instruct him not to 
6
 answer that. I don't think that's a proper question. 
7
 MR. OLSEN: It's not a question so much, Steve, 
* as an invitation to —-
9
 I MR. NEBEKER: I'm going to instruct him not to 
respondc I don't want him to respond to an open-ended request 
U like that. 
12 MR. OLSEN: I understand that, and that's all I 
13 J have. 
MS. DALLIMORE: One other matter, and that is 
concerning documents. The only documents I think we have 
identified today that we would like to see copies of are 
,7
 I the assignment of contract and Mr. Fletcher's manuals and 
*
8
 I writings. Also, if he made security manuals, reports or 
*
9
 ' those kinds of things 
MR. NEBEKER: Now, I think in terms of Mr. Fletcher 
manuals, you better subpoena those. I don't know if we have 
22
 I those. In terms of the assignment, since it's just been 
23
 • executed, I think within the last month, I guess we should 
2 4
 I THE WITNESS: Within the last month, yes. 
25



























subpoena that, and you can just direct it to Mr. White. 
MR. OLSEN: Should we send it to you, Steve, and —j 
MR. NEBEKER: You can send it to me and I will get 
it to Mr. White. 
MS. DALLIMORE: We can go off the record. 
(An off the record discussion 
was held.) 
MR. NEBEKER: Let the record show I don't have 
any questions of Mr. White. 
(Whereupon, the taking of this 
deposition was concluded.) 
-oOo-
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 I I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have read the foregoing 
7
 testimony consisting of 169 pages, numbered from 
8
 J to 169 inclusive, and the same is a true and 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of D a r c i e H. White 
the witness in the foregoing deposition named, was taken before me, 
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 I R a s h e l l G a r c i a 
, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public 
in and for the State of Utah residing at S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
That the said witness was by me, before examination duly sworn to 
testify the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth in said 
cause. 
That the testimony of said witness was reported by me in steno-
type, and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into typewriting, 
and that a full, true, and correct transcription of said testimony so 
taken and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered from 
_3 to 169 , inclusive, and said witness deposed and said as in the 
foregoing annexed deposition. 
I further certify that after the said deposition was transcribed 
the original of same was delivered to Mr. Nebeker attorney for 
the Witness to be by him submitted to the witness for reading 
and signature, signed before a Notary Public and to be returned to me 
for filing with the Clerk of the said court. 
I further certify that I am not of kin or otherwise associated with) 
any of the parties to said cause of action, and that I am not interested 
in the event thereof. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
11 day of April 1984 . 
My commission expires: 
December 15, 1984. ^ ^ " ~" " ^ n NU^^N V^^ : 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 




CS NO. 1 
Ospu 
On September 12, 1984, a hearing was held in this 
Court pursuant to Notice on Motions submitted by parties 
who were subject to subpoena under this Criminal Investiga-
tion proceeding. The Court ruled from the bench on most 
Motions and took under advisement the challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Act (77-22-1 et s e q . ) , authorizing 
the investigative procedure being used as raised by several 
of the parties for the first time in their own behalf and by 
other parties on a Motion to reconsider. 
The Court previously considered the constitutional 
challenge to the Act at a hearing held on May 30, 1984, and 
the Court ruled at that time that the Court would give the 
Act the presumption of constitutionality provided that in 
its application the State Prosecutors comply with the follow-
ing requirements: 
1. Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to the 
Act must be informed whether or not they are 
targets of the investigation; 
Recorded in Judgment Record 
:
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2. Such witnesses must be informed of 
the nature of the matter under investigation 
and the scope of the investigation; 
3, Investigations conducted under the 
authority of the Act must be limited to 
criminal investigations within the parameters 
of the initial good cause affidavit. 
Since that ruling, the Court has had opportunity 
to see the manner in which the Act has been applied and is 
being applied and the way it can be used to violate the 
personal rights of the citizens of this state. 
For instance, the subpoena duces tecum served upon 
Emery Mining Company commands that Company to produce: 
"records which identify all officers, 
directors, consultants and employees 
(both union and non-union, professional 
and mining) of Emery Mining for the period 
1979 to the present. Such shall include, 
but not be limited to, names, addresses, 
telephone numbers, dates of employment 
and employee numbers, if known." 
Upon challenge, this Court ordered that general 
subpoena suppressed as being too broad in any investigation 
of any criminal activity. 
A previous subpoena issued by the Attorney General's 
Office attempted to get into Utah Power and Light Company's 
dealings in uranium mining, when in fact the original Good 
Cause Affidavit mentioned no indication of any criminal deal-
ings in this area. The State withdrew this subpoena when 
challenged in this court. 
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Another subpoena issued out of this proceeding 
was directed to a CPA firm and ordered the production of 
the following: 
"You are commanded to bring with you any and all 
books, records, papers of any kind relating to 
Mike Thompson and Associates, Guardex, Alarmex, 
Vanguard, Mike Thompson, individually; Mike Ziemski, 
individually; Bruce Conklin, individually; Patsy 
Bowman, individually; and all other individuals 
and/or entities associated therewith." 
This subpoena was withdrawn by the State upon challenge in 
this Court. 
The deposition of L. Brent Fletcher,taken pursuant 
to subpoena issued under this investigative proceeding, did 
not comply with the requisites that this Court feels must be 
imposed to make the Act constituional in its application in 
that the witness never was informed that he was a target, 
nor as to the nature of the investigation and, because of 
the Secrecy Order, he had no way of knowing whether the matter 
being inquired into was within the perimeter of the good cause 
showing- He was allowed, and did have, his attorney present 
with him during these proceedings. 
Some criminal charges have already been filed in Salt 
Lake County based upon information obtained through this proceed-
ing, and a civil anti-trust case has been filed in Salt Lake 
County, also as a result of some of the information derived from 
this investigative proceeding. This investigative proceeding is 
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still open and being used for whatever purposes the State 
desires and solely within their discretion under the Act, 
without limitation as to when a criminal investigation 
becomes a prosecution or controlling the ultimate use of 
the findings for civil purposes. 
The Act has been abused and is subject to continued 
abuse under its broad terms and provisions that set no limit-
ations upon the State or any guidelines to the use of their 
subpoena power. The Court quite agrees with the Utah Supreme 
Court in its statement given in the case of In Re The Matter of 
Nelda Boyer, 636 P2d 1085, wherein the Court states as follows: 
"When State action impinges on fundamental rights, 
due process requires standards which clearly 
define the scope of permissable conduct so as 
to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those rights." 
This Court has, therefore, concluded that the Act 
is too vague and does not give proper protection to individual 
citizens against violation of their constituional right of 
due process and protection against self-incrimination and 
allows for an absolute abuse of power without the benefit of 
judicial review or control once the general subpoena power 
is granted and finds the Act is unconstitutional. 
-4-
xxxiv 
THEREFORE* the Court does hereby dismiss this 
Criminal Investigative Proceeding and strikes the Investigative 
Subpoena Power heretofore granted to the State by this Court* 
DATED this , ^ / ^ d a y of September, 1984. 
1Z. ' 
BOYD BUNNELL/'DI5TRICT COURT; 
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SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF EMERY, STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD BUNNELL, Judge Date May 30, 1984 
John Greenig, Court Reporter Case No,. 
TITLE (Parties Present) COUNSEL (Counsel Present) 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Proceedings Before the Court - HEARING 
This matter came before the Court on a Hearing. Counsel present for the 
Plaintiff was Suzanne Dallimore, Assistant Attorney General, Stan Olsen, and 
David Sundeman. Counsel present for the Defendant was Donald Hoi brook, Jeffery 
Filburg, Stan Nebeker, and John Adams. 
Discussion in this matter concerned three areas, 1) Targets being deposed 
need to be told if they are a target in the investigation so that they might 
be given time to seek counsel. 2) Targets should be advised of the nature 
and scope of which they are chargedc 3) Subpeonas should not request documents 
that are not relevate to that particular case. 
After much argument by counsel, the Court ruled: 1) Persons must be told 
he is target when he becomes such* 2) Target must be told nature and scope 
of investigation so that he may claim privileges, 3) Can not request documents 
unless it discloses information for that particular case, 4) Information 




TRANSCRIPTS OF LEGISLATIVE DEBATES, 
THIRD READING OF HOUSE BILL 121, 
MARCH 10 & 11, 1971 
Clerks An act relating to the subpoena powers in aid 
of criminal investigations and prosecutions, authorizing the 
Attorney General, District Attorneys, County Attorneys to 
compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses; providing for 
the procedural requisites necessary for securing a subpoena, 
the court procedure to be followed in obtaining the testimony 
or evidence, and the procedures for securing an order requiring 
the person subpoenaed to testify or produce evidence; and 
establishing the power of the Attorney General to grant 
immunity from prosecution to witnesses in aid of criminal 
investigations and prosecutions• 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Section 1; It is declared, as a matter of legislative 
determination that there has been a marked increase in crime 
and criminal activity within this state, and that in order to 
protect the public health, safety, and morals, it is necessary 
to grant subpoena powers in aid of criminal investigations 
conducted by the Attorney General, District Attorneys, and 
Couaty Attorneys, and to provide a method of keeping 
information gained from investigations secret both to protect 
the innocent, and to prevent criminal suspects from having 
access to information prior to prosecution to the detriment of 
the proper enforcement of the criminal laws of this state, and 
to clarify the power of the Attorney General, District 
Attorneys, and County Attorneys to grant immunity from 
prosecution of witnesses whose testimony is essential to the 
proper conduct of an investigation of criminal activities and 
prosecution of crimes committed within this state • . • • 
Mr. Speakers Representative Fishero 
Representative Fisheri Speaker, I move that we 
suspend the rules and discontinue reading the remainder of the 
bill and consider it read and ready for consideration of the 
committee reporte 
Mr* Speakers It has been moved and seconded that we 
dispense with the reading of the rest of the bill* Those in 
favor say "Aye". 
Responses Aye 
Mr. Speakers Opposed, "no." 
^2-
(No response) 
Mr. Speaker; The motion is carried and we will ask 
the reading clerk to read the committee report• 
Clerk: Mr. Speaker the committee on judiciary 
(inaudible) the House (inaudible) House Bill 121 by Mr. Fisher 
that all subpoena powers has carefully considered said bill and 
reports the same not favorably with the following amendments: 
Page 2, delete lines 27, 28 and 29; Page 2, line 31, delete the 
words "with the approval of the attorney general". That's page 
2, line 31, delete the words "with the approval of the attorney 
general." Page 3, line 1, after the word "general", add these 
words: "district attorney or county attorney." Page 3, line 
29, delete the word "faction" and add the word "act." Page 3, 
line 29, delete the words "the subpoena" and add the words "any 
other." Page 3, line 30, delete the word "of" and add "granted 
to." Page 3, line 30, after the word "and" add "or." Well, 
that's "/or"; they have "and/or". Page 3, line 31, delete 
"greeted" under Section 77-45-1. Respectfully represented by 
Representative Florence, Chairman. 




Mr. Speaker: It is been moved and seconded we adopt 
the committee report* Those in favor say "Aye*81 
Responses "Aye*" 
Mr« Speaker; Opposed. 
(no response) 
Mr. Speakeri Report is adopted• Representative 
Fisher. 
Representative Fishers Thank you Mr* Speaker and 
members of the House. The purpose of the bill is to permit the 
investigation of criminal activities and suspect crimes by 
those who are charged with investigation, be it the present 
district attorney, the county attorney, or the attorney 
general's office by allowing those offices to grant immunity to 
those giving testimony and allowing them to subpoena witnesses 
and to bring people before them for the purpose of obtaining 
information for the filing of criminal complaint. There are 
some subpoena powers at this time available to these people but 
they are based upon the filing of complaint and then the 
subpoena of witnesses and this action would take place prior to 
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the filing of complaints and would not necessarily come about 
in the filing of a criminal complaint or culminate in that 
activity. There is one suggested amendment that I think 
appropriate and that is on page 2, line 4. It is suggested 
that the subpoena power be limited to approval of the district 
court and so on line 4, after the word "right" "have the 
right", insert the word "upon application and approval of the 
district court for good cause shown." 
Rep* Fisher: It would then read, if I may begin with 
section 2, "In any matter involving the investigation of a 
crime the existence of a crime or an criminal conspiracy or 
activity the attorney general, any district attorney or any 
county attorney shall have the right upon application and 
approval of the district court for good cause shown to subpoena 
witnesses, compel their attendance, etc." I realize that the 
amendment exceeds ten words and I move the waiver or the 
suspension of the rules for the submission of that amendment 
and the adoption of the amendment. 
Mr. Speaker: It's been moved then that the rules be 
suspended and the bill go amended to insert the words "upon 
application and approval of the district court for good cause 
shown." Any discussion or plea (interruption by another voice): 
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Mr. Speaker, I9m against that amendment. The purpose 
of this is to give the investigative officer the opportunity to 
issue a subpoena in order that he might make his investigation 
complete*) I appreciate the fact that there are some who would 
like to get the court involved in this thing, but I really feel 
that if we elect a county attorney, district attorney and 
attorney general who are competent and responsible individuals 
they will not abuse this power, but at the same time if it is 
going to be necessary for them to go to a court and obtain from 
the court permission to do this, to a very large extent this 
subpoena filed will be nullified and I think that we ought not 
do any more than we now have done with respect to this matter 
and I urge that you do not support this amendment. 
Mr. Speaker; Representative Mecham, do you want to 
speak on the amendment? 
Representative Mechams No, I8d like to speak on the 
bill. 
Mr. Speakers Alright. 
Another Voices Question? 
Mr. Speaker; Question . . • Representative Florence. 
Representative Florence; Amendment, yes. I've had it 
expressed to me by a couple of county attorneys that they are 
in favor of this amendment not so much that they are in fear of 
abuse by their own office, but it is subject to possible 
abuse. In a sense, it involves a possible dragnet situation if 
we allowed complete discretion with the prosecuting attorney to 
subpoena any person that he may want even though that 
individual would have to be given immunity prior to testifying 
to any criminal implication. It is still something which 
delves upon an individual's personal freedom and right to 
privacy and there should be some limited area where a person 
could, in fact, have this reviewable by a judicial body based 
on probable cause so it cannot be a spurious subpoena to 
investigate into matters which totally are without the realm of 
some criminal activity. 
Mr. Speaker; Representative Cottle. 
Representative Cottle; I would like to concur. I'm 
in favor of this because I could see a possible abuse of this. 
In fact I feel that the subpoena law at the present time is 
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being abused and so I vote to just say that I would be in favor 
of it « 
Mr* Speakers Those in favor of the amendment say 
"Aye11. 
Responses "Aye". 
Mr > Speaker s Opposed, "No\ 
Responses "No18 • 
Mr. Speakers The amendment is carried• The bill is 
before us as amended. Representative Fisher• 
Representative Fishers Members of the house I am not 
a grammarian, but the amendment * • • (interrupted) 
Mr. Speakers Yes, Representative Buckway. 
Representative Buckways (inaudible) 
Mr* Speakers Yes, that was part of the amendment? 
that was part of the motion, I should say, that the* rule has 
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been suspended and the amendment be made; so the amendment is 
now in the bill. Continue Representative Fisher. 
Representative Fisher: Thank you. On page 3, the 
committee added the words "and/or" and as I review those two 
words in years past in legal language they were used every 
other word and every other sentence and they are now more than 
archaic; they ought to be dead. The same with the word "said" 
the "said parties or the said contracts". I think that it is 
understood now that when the word "or" is used it applies to 
either or all of them together and I think the words "and/or" 
have no place in modern grammatic construction. I may stand 
corrected but that's my own feeling about it and I think in 
that correction on line 30 of line 3, we ought to strike the 
words "and" and the "slash" and leave the word "or" as it's 
been inserted. 
Mr. Speaker; The amendment then is to take the 
"slash" and the "or" out. 
Representative Fisher: No, the "slash" and the "and". 
Mr. Speaker: The "slash" and the "and"? 
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Representative Fisher: Yes* 
Mr* Speakers Alright• Is there any debate on this 
motion? (No response.) Those in favor say "Aye1** 
Response; Aye 
Mr* Speaker: Opposed, "No"* The amendment is 
carried* Thank you. Is there any further debate on this 
bill? Representative Mecham? 
Representative Mechams I have some concern about this 
bill because I wonder if we8re not really eating away at our 
freedoms by going this subpoena power• I guess the tax 
commission of the supreme power; does the governor have 
subpoena power? does the auditor? the treasurer? We ought to 
go a little slower with this and I don't say that I disfavor 
this bill* but ... seems to me that the more openly we give 
this tremendous power of subpoena to these other offices and, I 
just wonder if it8s right. I don't know if it is or if it 
isn't, but I think that we ought to make sure that what we do 
here is right* I know that the attorney general and the 
district attorney and the county attorney ought to be able to 
investigate crime. They've been doing for it many, many years 
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but now we*re going to tighten down a little and put somebody 
in jail, I suppose, if he perjures himself through an 
examination resulting from the issuance of a subpoena. And, I 
don't know. I have some hesitations about the whole bill 
because I think that maybe we are destroying just a little more 
of the right that we have as citizens and I think that somebody 
and I would like to be the proponent of this feat along the 
realms that I ask so that you see the other side of the 
picture. It just doesn't matter if giving this power away so 
lightly and anyway this power of subpoena has a lot of, just 
what the word says, it's power because you can be (handed) in; 
you can get what the lawyers call a subpoena duces tecum and 
they can require you to bring your automobile and all of your 
books and records and you can sit there before a court reporter 
and be examined and cross-examined and new actions will be 
found and I don't know about that. I would like to have 
somebody defend this bill a little more. It seems to me that, 
it appears that I wouldn't want to hamstring law enforcement 
because I'm for that too, but on the other hand, when you weigh 
these things and the balance, you see there is quite a problem 
here and anyone (inaudible) some your rights. What do you say 
about that, Representative Fisher? 
Mr. Speaker; Representative Fisher?... 
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Representative Fisher; Mr. Speaker and members of 
House, subpoena powers are used for the purpose of obtaining 
evidence and testimony. I think I can only use the example 
that was given to me by the attorney general's office from 
where this bill comes. There is some indication that one of 
the small counties in northern, . . . or small cities in 
northern Davis County has had some difficulty with the creaming 
off of funds from construction contracts. And they've 
endeavored for a number of months to obtain evidence by 
testimony concerning that but, without the power to grant 
immunity, they've been unable to obtained that evidence* Also, 
without the opportunity to bring testimony prior to the filing 
of complaint by subpoena they are unable to obtain that 
evidence. With the subpoena power, they could obtain that 
evidence and if it showed what is believed is occurring, then 
the action could be brought and a complaint filed. If it does 
not come to fruition, then a lot of embarrassment as to one 
public official could be salvaged without going further. That 
was a simple example of part of the reason of this act and I 
don8t believe it's an area where abuse will be taken. 
Representative Mecham will remember that his Ombudsman Bill was 
declared unconstitutional because it gave no protection to the 
subpoena power that that committee obtained under the bill that 
we passed and, for that reason, the court said it was not a 
•12-
constitutional act; at least in this instance. Now, we have 
required that these subpoenas be issued the same as would a 
search warrant of a person's home or search warrant of his car 
or his person. 
Mr, Speaker; Representative Gar-ine: 
Representative Gardner: I agree with Representative 
Mecham. Possibly this should take a little further study and, 
noting the hour, I tnoved that we adjourn until ten o'clock in 
the morning. 
Response: (Aye) 
Mr. Speaker: It's been moved and seconded that we 
adjourn unti1 10:00 a.m tomorrow morni ng. Are tl lere any 
announcements before I place that motion? Representative 
Buckway? 
Representative Buckway: (Inaudible) 
Speaker: Thank you. 
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Representative Gardner; Thank you. State, Federal 
and Military Affairs in Room 313 immediately* 
Mr. Speaker; Representative Humphrey. 
Representative Humphrey; Public Safety at five 
o'clock in Room 309. 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Peterson. 
Representative Peterson: Highways and Aeronautics 
will meet immediately after adjournment« 
Representative Oberhansen: Political Subdivisions 
will meet at 5:00. 
Representative Warren: Revenue and Taxation will meet 
at 5:00 in 303c 
Mr. Speaker: Are there any further announcements? 
Those in favor of adjourning until tomorrow morning at 10:00 





Motion is carried* 
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CONTINUATION OF DEBATE ON H.B. 121, MARCH, 11, 1971 
House Bill 121 
Mr. Speakers I'm happy to have you students come and 
visit us. Representatives, at adjournment time yesterday, we 
were considering HB 121 and it's now unfinished business and we 
will revert to that measure. This is a measure on which there 
was some debate and there were people standing at adjournment 
time to debate it further. The chair recaills that there had 
been some amendments proposed and adoptede Representative 
Fisher? 
Representative Fisher; HB-121 is the subpoena powers 
granting to the attorney general, the county attorneys and for 
two more years, presumably, the district attorneys an 
opportunity to obtain evidence by investigation without the 
filing of complaint for the determination of whether or not 
criminal complaints should be filed. We inserted an amendment 
on page 2 indicating that the subpoena should be issued 
pursuant to the authority and approval of the district court 
and I think with that amendment, we have a bill that is usable 
and of great benefit to law enforcement. 
-i fi 
Mr* Speaker: Thank you. 
Mr. Speaker: We111 be in a position here to vote in 
just a minute. [Long pause while inaudible discussion goes on] 
Mr. Speaker: Representatives, for your information, 
President Barlow has requested that they be allowed to work on 
Senate bills today in view of the fact that the House 
apparently has passed more bills now than the Senate has and he 
wants time to catch up and since we only have two Senate bills, 
I told him that subject to the approval of the House t-hat we 
would work on House bills today. Yes, Representative Cottle? 
Representative Cottle: Is the measurement in that 
vein be in order now? 
Mr. Speaker: Yes, it would be, 
Cottle: I make { ne motion then that we work on House 
bills today rather than the Senate bills. 
Mr. Speaker: Thank you. It's been moved and seconded 
that we work on House bills today. Is there any discussion? 





Mr* Speakers Motion is carried* Representative 
Warren? 
Representative Warreng Mr* Speaker, members of the 
House, we have a lot of very important bills on the calendar 
In the interest of time, I'm wondering if a motion wouldn1t be 
in order to limit debate to not exceed 30 minutes today* I so 
move* 
Mr, Speaker; It's been moved and seconded that on 
measures today that debate be limited to 30 minutes* Is there 
any discussion on this proposal? Representative Redd? 
Representative Redds I would like to amend that 
motion that we limit each participant or speaker to a 2-1/2 
minute time limit* 
1 ft-
Mr. Speaker: You would limit 30 minutes per bill but 
2-1/2 minutes for each speaker? 
Representative Redd,, Right• . 
Mr* Speakers Is there any debate on that amendment? 
Representative Carling. 
Representative Carling,;; I think that in some cases, 
if you've got an important bill and it's going to take some 
explanation, such 2-1/2 minutes might be too short. I think 
the 1/2 hour limit is probably a good limit* And let that be 
divided as the speaker would see fit between the two parties, 
the two sides, if Hiere is two sides. '\n<! I haven't got a bill 
up there and I don't intend to talk. (Ha. Ha. Ha.) 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Woodmurphy. 
Representative Woodmurphy: I think we're kind of 
categorizing all these bills, aren't we? We're all saying that 
they are all going to be equally important or equally 
unimportant« However, you will . there may be some bills 
to which we should give further attention. And some to which 
we should give l«vs, Might we consider a degree of flexibility 
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here? In our last session, we had motion "A" as I recall. I 
don't know quite how to delineate this situation here, . . • 
Mr. Speaker; Well, I could observe this that in the 
event that an important bill came up and the House decided that 
more than 30 minutes was necessary, I could always at the end 
of 30 minutes vote to continue the debate. 
Representative Woodmurphys Okay, thank you. 
Hro Speakers It8s been moved and seconded then that 
debate be limited to 30 minutes on each bill and that no 
speaker take longer than 2-1/2 minutes and I would assume that 
this would mean the sponsor, however, could have 2-1/2 minutes 
at the start and 2-1/2 minutes at the end. Those in favor of 
the motion . • •• Representative Starr, did you want to speak? 
Representative Starrs No. 





Mr. Speakers The motion is carried* Now 
Representatives >^  5re in a position to vote on HB-121 and 
voting is open and will each member record his vote. [PAUSE] 
Mr* Speaker; Stevens have you voted? Thank you. 
Rep. Anderson is absent. Rep. Atkin, Gardner, Sowards, Rep. 
Mathisen, Rep• Nol der; Okay, al 1 right, etc. Rep. Hansen, 
Clark. 
Mr. Speaker; It appears to the Speaker that everyone 
present has voted. The voting will be closed and HB-121 is 
passed by a vote of 42 to 17 and will be 1: eferred to the Senate 





Transcripts of Legislative Debates, House Bill Number 32, 
January 19, 20, and February 1, 1980, State of Utah 
House Debate on House Bill Number 32, January 1980 
Speaker; All in favor say Aye 
Response? Aye• 
Speakers Those opposed say no* (No response) 
Speakers Motion carries * Go ahead• 
Representatives Thank you Mr* Speaker. Ladies and 
gentlemen of the house • c » 
Representative s Just a minute, that has not been read 
in. Read it in please. 
Representatives House Bill No. 32 Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure by Representative Roger A. Livingston. Be 
it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah • . • 
Speaker; Representative Livingston. 
Representative Livingston; Thank you Mr. Speaker. 
Ladies and gentlemen, i f I could introduce House Bill 32 to you 
by relaying as accurate as I can a telephone conversation I had 
this morning. The Chief of Police of Provo City, whom I had 
never met before, called and asked for the status of House Bill 
32 and literally pleaded with me for the sake of his local law 
enforcement that House Bi] 1 3 2 "be passed and hi s comment is not 
far different from those that I've related to you before from 
county attorneys, from judges and others throughout t: he state 
who have said, "the Bill's not perfect, it's not the way that I 
would write it if I had the total authorship but the need to 
have this occur is so great :±n«i we are so hamstrung right now 
with the confusion regarding the rules of the game, the rules 
of procedure tha^ •-<. '•.;:><-..-; ••--•••-; Hill passed."1 As he expressed 
to me a great deal of frustration as others have who work in 
this area why it has taken so many years and years and years to 
have this ..*-modification take place. House Bill 32 is a 
lengthy bill and I apologize to you for the length of that 
particularly in trie 'r idget session. It's a cumbersome thing to 
have before you. Let me point out that a third of what is 
before you is already in the Utah Code. It's simply reputing 
and reenacting it. Why are we reputing it? Well to put it in 
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proper sequence, to have it sequestially work hand in hand with 
the substantive criminal code that Representative White earlier 
alluded to* Some six or seven years ago this completely 
repealed and reenacted a new penal code that defined what the 
crimes are in the State of Utah* At that time there should 
have been a new Code of Criminal Procedure enacted that would 
tfork hand and glove with that as the old procedure worked hand 
in hand with the old law and that's never taken place. The net 
cesult that there is a tremendous amount of ambiguity, of 
confusion, of difficulty in administering the entire criminal 
and penal process. I mentioned that a third of this bill is 
simply reenactment of the prior law. Additionally, a 
substantial portion of this is placing into the Code what is 
low the law relating to procedure as a result of both Utah 
Supreme Court case and the United States Supreme Court case law 
and those are already the law of the State of Utah but because 
It's not set forth clearly and succinctly and in a proper 
sequence it makes it very very confusing for people who work in 
this area. So House Bill 32 is the result of a Herculean 
effort over many years by many people in trving to pull 
together a desperately needed task and that is the entire 
decompilation or remodification of all the rules of criminal 
procedurec Because of the length of the bill and the 
Logistical problems of having them prepared and typed and the 
versions of them, there were some amendments made last year by 
this body to this bill as well as amendments made by the 
Interim Committee which were not included in the bill as it was 
presented and introduced into this body and accordingly there 
were amendments made by the Standing Committee and those 
amendments appear in the pink sheets in your book. 
Additionally, Mr. Speaker, I do have a page and a half of 
amendments that I would like to move at this time. i believe 
they've all •' * . they've been passed out to all of the 
Representatives. It's on a page and a half of loose sheets. 
If any of you don't have this, would you raise your hand and 
I'll make sure a messenger brings one to you. Mr. Speaker, 
would I be in order to move all of the amendments it one time? 
I have . • . if It would be in order, I'd like to just refer to 
these amendments and then move them in one motion. 
Speakers All right, go ahead. 
Representative Livingston: The first amendment refer 
to • * • add some language that this body overwhelmingly 
suggested on a separate bi 11 sponsored by Representative 
Selleneit which requires a defendant upon certain conditions to 
pay part of the cost of a criminal defense. And this is •--•?* 
amendment regarding page 44, line 12. The next section 
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provides some protection to a defendant regarding night search 
warrants and this is kind of a controversial thing and that, 
generally, prosecutors don't want it, defense attorneys do want 
it. Those that do want the amendments and this motion is made 
and these amendments are submitted in the spirit of compromise 
and, being conciliatory, I think it's the feeling of the county 
attorneys that the need for the bill is so* great that they 
would rather include this and make it a little more defense 
oriented for the . • • just so that we can get the bill passed 
at this time. The final amendment on the first page regards 
protection to newspaper, news media and others who have 
expressed some concern about the ability of law enforcement 
people to search newsrooms and other areas that have 
constitutionally protected rights and, so, that amendment 
requires that if a subpoena would obtain the information, then 
a search warrant would not be issued and it provides the 
specific protection for news sources and confidentially 
protected relationships like that and I believe this is the 
amendment that Representative Fox inquired about earlier. 
There is a deletion of the no-knock provision on page 66, line 
13 and then the final amendment is to administrative search 
warrant provision and this is one that Representative Selleneit 
called to our attention and it places the requirement for 
probable cause that a crime has been committed before an 
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administrative search warrant could issue• Without that 
amendment, there is some fear of OSHA nr some other 
administrative agency perhaps overstepping their bounds with 
respect to search warrants. So these amendments that tfm 
moving at this time, I hope would alleviate any of the prior 
controversy which you may have heard concerning these bills. 
It's a good faith effort by the county attorneys, associations 
and others to make this bill as acceptable to as many groups as 
possible and I would move all of these "intendment s * -. i qiuup, 
Mr. Speaker. 
Speaker ? Would someone • * * We need those amendments 
in the circle. It1 very important we have them and correctly 
stated or it won't get into the journal that wa ' "iii«{ vnt're in 
trouble. Does everyone have those amendments? They're on a 
white sheet. They should be on a pink sheet but we'll overlook 
that. Now to the Livingston amendments. I see no lights on 
Representative Livingston, we'll call for the question on your 
amendments. All in favor say Aye. 
Response: Aye. 
Speaker: Those opposed say no« (No response) 
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Speaker: Motion carried. Now the bill as amended* 
To the bill. Representative Fox. 
Representative Foxs I'm a bit concerned about the 
size of this bill that we have before us in this very busy 
budget session. It's 161 pages long. There are some very 
subtle but very significant changes that are being made in our 
criminal code. I'm concerned that we, as busy legislators, 
haven't had the time to read all 161 pages and understand the 
changes. I'm still trying to find out what all of the 
amendments did to the present bill before us. If you've read 
the Salt Lake City Tribune for Monday and Tuesday, you811 
notice that they editorialized both days against this bill and 
I think that they did that for substantive reasons. I think 
there's no question that we need a revision in our criminal 
code, but I believe that that revision should be done at a time 
when we as legislators have enough time to be able to take a 
solid look at what these changes are going to meane Criminal 
Code revisions should be put over until the next regular 
session. If we act too hastily, we're going to be impacting 
the state for years to come until these changes are finally 
worked out. I think there's no real great rush to move into 
this. The Salt Lake Tribune talked about two aspects, one was 
use immunity and the other was the search warrants. They 
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pointed out that they believed that these provisions did not 
need to be changed, I'm not sure what those amendments did and 
I believe that most of the legislatures in here don't know what 
those amendments did, I think we ve got plenty of time to talk 
about this bill and I think we should continue it in the next 
session. I would urge you to vote against it. 
Speaker; Thank you. Representative Selleneit. 
Representative Selleneit: Mr. Speaker, I rise to 
support the bill. 1 had many concerns on the bill too md hav^ 
spent a great deal of time and I would say that 95% of my 
concerns have been addressed in the amendments as made. 1 
think it is needed and I would encourage your support. 
Speakers Thank you. Representative Livingston, 
seeing no further lights, do you want to quickly sum it? 
Representative Livingston: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. 
Again, Representatives, this is a bill that represents a 
monumental task in bringing it to you. T 'issute you that if I 
had the total prerogative of authorship, there would be 
amendments that I would want and I am sure that there are many 
who would have that. But we need the remodification that needs 
-8-
to be done at this time and in subsequent sessions there could 
be fine tuning to it? but, as county attorneys and police 
officials and others throughout the entire state, both 
prosecution and defense attorneys, saying we need this, this 
has to be done and I urge your favorable support* Thank you* 
Speakers Thank you. Voting is now open* There is a 
chair that all present have voted* Voting will now be closed. 
HB 32 as amended has received 47 affirmative votes, 22 negative 
votes. Pass this house and will be sent to the Senate for 
their further consideration* Representative Bishop. 
House Debate of H.B. 32, February 1, 1984 
(after Senate Consideration) 
Speaker; Utah Code of Criminal Procedure by 
Representative Roger A. Livingston. The bill is returned here 
for further house action. Respectfully, Sophia C. Buckmiller, 
secretary to the Senate. 
Speakers Senate Bill 43 will be signed as 15. 32, is 
that the next one you read? Representative Livingston. 
«.g^  
Representative Livingston; Mr. Speaker, 1 would 
(inaudible) that we concur with the Senate amendments regarding 
House Bill 32. 
Speaker: You've heard the motion that we concur with 
the Senate amendments on • . • Bill 32 . . . 
Representative: Does that require a roll call vote 
Mr. Speaker? 
Speaker: . . . les that requires a roll call vote. 
First we*11 take your motion to place it and then we'll go to 
the roll call. All in favor say Aye. 
Response: Aye. 
Speaker: Those opposed say no. (No response) 
Speaker: Motion carried We111 now have to vote 
again on that bill. Let's quickly vote. All present have 
voted on this. Voting will now be clob^l . House Bi I ( 32 
received b4 itfirmative, zero negative votes. Passed this 
House. 
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Senate Debate on House Bill 32, January 1980 
Presidentt House Bill 32, Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure by Representative Roger A. Livingston, This is a 
long title so . * « 
Senators Mr. President, I move that under suspension 
of the rules we suspend reading of the entire title on this 
bill. 
Presidents All in favor of suspending the rules in 
reading this short title say Aye* 
Responses Aye• 
Presidents Opposed• (No response) So be it. 
Presidents The Senators I'm sure will remember that 
the long length of time that we spent last session on these two 
bills. They are the same bills, House Bill 32 and House Bill 
31, are the same bills that we started in the Senate last 
time* You811 recall that we passed them here in this body and 
they they died in the final crunch over in the House, partly 
because they were late getting in. They're such big bills that 
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it took our legal services a long time to finish the drafting 
of it, but partly because a few people over in the House had 
some questions about parts of it. And so its now had another 
year of study. Let me just fill in the background. You'll 
recall that in 1963 the Legislature, through their interim 
committees process organized an interim study with regard to 
our Criminal Code which ultimately resulted in, eight years 
later, in 1973, in a complete revision of the Criminal Code of 
the State of Utah. It was a massive project. Simultaneously, 
and in relation to that, there was also a review by Interim 
Committee of the Criminal Procedures Code. Part of the problem 
was that our Criminal Procedure Laws for the State of Utah 
essentially all of them dated back to the original statehood in 
1898. Those procedures had been here and there through 
patchwork legislation modified over the year but, substantially 
have remained the same. We've updated and modernized our 
Criminal Code but, we need to modernize and conform to that 
Criminal Code, our Criminal Procedures Code and also the rules 
that the Court use in applying the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
Now, further, I'll refresh your memory that the study on these 
particular code amendments began as an interim study group nine 
years ago under Judge Croft and members of our interim 
legislative study who spent four years redrafting all of our 
Cod3 of Criminal Procedures. After that was done a follow up 
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committee was organized under the direction of Judge Crockett 
in the Supreme Court who then took work and went back paragraph 
by paragraph and sentence by sentence reviewing, revising, 
modifying and updating it* That group spent four years on it* 
I was a member of that committee and so were another 
legislature and they had sessions in the areas of criminal 
defense and criminal prosecution working on that. As a result 
of that, the bill was brought in last session. We made some 
amendments and there are some that will need to be put in here 
from the floor to conform with the same bill that we has last 
session, but, essentially what I'm saying is we've had nine 
years of (inaudible) a detailed study of this criminal 
procedure code by experts and by members of the legislature to 
come in with recommendations. It has to do with many areas of 
the code which is used by the courts to determine or to confirm 
procedures in criminal prosecutionsc It is a very broad 
thingo Its many pages long, I have sent out to the desks of 
the Senators about a twenty page summary earlier today so we 
would have an opportunity to refresh your memories on it and 
essentially what it does is« Bring current and update our 
statutes of criminal procedure, it repeals all of the existing 
procedural law and replaces them with this broad and extensive 
change much of which, by the way, merely ceenacts Code sections 
the way they presently are but in those areas where we needed 
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to conform it to the criminal code or to update it, it makes 
the changes. So, I would be glad to respond to questions if 
there are questions but essentially its the same bill that we 
passed last session. 
Senator Asay; Mr. President. 
President; Senator Asay. 
Senator Asay: As a member of the Joint Judiciary 
Committee, we studied this for some months last, during the 
interim, and I tried to make a real conscientious study of the 
bill because of its great length and complexity, I've just 
. . . didn't have the understanding to (inaudible) and, so, I 
called those who would know more about it. Both legal and in 
the legal profession and otherwise and I feel good about the 
bill. I recognize that it isn't perfect and I see the House 
has done some (inaudible) on it work done on it but 
I can vote yes on this bill as well as the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. 
Presidents That's good. Next Mr. • 
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Senators Mr. President, I too was a member of that 
committee and heard the testimony and some of the concerns that 
were voiced. Senator Jackson indicated that it has been a 
total of nine years being studied by experts, studying all 
these nine years to refine it and bring it to its current 
(inaudible) and yet the House needed to amend it and I 
understand there are other amendments being proposed. I'm 
concerned (about) the length of this bill, the complexity of 
it. We have ought not to be considering it in this budget 
session when we have such limited time* If its been the nine 
years in the process, one more year will not make or break it; 
so, I fail to see the urgency of this and maybe Senator Jeffs 
can point out some emergencies I'm not aware of. 
Presidents Senator Jeffs. 
Senator Jeffss I think I can. I guess it depends on 
your philosophy as to what's needed. I personally feel that we 
need more strength in the unit of our criminal prosecution 
system and its urgent that we tighten it down. In many areas, 
that's precisely what this does and while we go on having 
prosecutions that are ineffectual because our statute's unclear 
and having perhaps defense counsel getting defendants free on 
technicalities, the purpose of this is to tighten it down so we 
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don't have so many problems with technical errors in criminal 
prosecution. I think thats urgent. 
President: Are there further questions? 
Senator: Senator Farley, I think has some . . . 
President: Senator Farley. 
Senator Farley: I expect to get this vote now. Mr. 
President, I have an amendment. I'm beginning to feel like a 
broken record on this amendment. Both of you who were here in 
1977 will remember that we successfully amended this criminal 
code revision the same way that we also successfully amended it 
last year and here we are again. What we're doing is really 
not an amendment, it is (inaudible) the immunities (inaudible) 
as our (inaudible) rather than replacing it with use immunity. 
For those of you who are not familiar with what it is, I've had 
passed out an editorial from the Tribune, Tuesday morning's 
Tribune of this week which explains relatively (inaudible) 
immunity so what I would like to ask you, and by the way I'm 
submitting this amendment which you have on a buff sheet with 
the concurrence of the author of the bill, concurrence of Roger 
Livingston, Representative Roger Livingston, to this amendment 
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and I would like now t ask you if you would consider on page 62 
(inaudible) that you find on the buff sheet. I think it 
probably shouldn't be necessary for me to read this entire 
sheet since this is the same amendment that you approved last 
year and the same amendment that you approved three years ago, 
Four years ago, '77, f79 and '80. 
Senator Jeffss Mr. President. 
Presidents Senator Jeffs* 
Senator Jeffss Responding to that, let me just 
comment that what this amendment would do would be to make a 
new law essentially the same as the present law and the new 
code section didn't have a recommendation for a modification. 
I agreed with Senator Farley last time that it should be 
amended this way if we want to make a determination at a later 
date as to whether or not use immunity should or should not be 
granted in Utah, I think that should not be done in this bill 
and so I support her amendment. 
Presidents Thank you Senator Jeffs. 
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President: You've heard the motion to amend is there 
further discussion? (Inaudible) called for on Senator Farley's 
amendment on the buff sheet. Any discussion? All in favor of 
the amendment say Aye. 
Responses Aye. 
President; Opposed. (No response) The motion 
carries. 
Senator; I have a question, Senator Jeffs. On 
page 12 where they're talking about impeachment proceedings, 
it looks like the House amended that. Do you know what the 
logic is there? 
Senator Jeffs; There's something about (inaudible) of 
the House or apparently prosecute the proceedings before this 
body I don't feel that it hurts or helps, I just . . . 
Senator: No, I have not received a copy of it, but, I 
listened to Representative Livingston, the chief sponsor, he 
said it was some of them over there preferred this different 
language and he saw no objection to it. 
.1 Q„ 
Senator: I don't either but I was curious as to the 
logic of it. 
Senator Jeffs; Mr* President* 
Presidents Senator Jeffs. 
Senator Jeffs; Yes, our State Highway Patrol has 
contacted me in connection with an amendment that apparently 
has been left out in terms of a typo and I've had that passed 
out. Also, Senator Snow has an amendment that if somebody can 
bring him in, I think he wants to make« While he's coming, let 
me explain to you the nature of this amendment. It's been 
handed out to you and it is on page 25. Having to do with the 
fresh pursuit and the basic problem is that in the typing of 
the buff sheet, we gave the right to out of state police 
officers to come racing into Utah under fresh pursuit, but, we 
left out the language that allows our own officers to do it and 
you can imagine that our officers were a little concerned with 
that, so, that I offer this amendment on page 25, line 31 after 
the words "proceedings", add the new section 77-9-3 to put back 
into this code, the right that they presently have to not 
pursue« 
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President: You've heard the motion by Senator Jeffs. 
Hot isn't it? 
Senator: Ye s. 
President: All in favor of Senator Jeffs' amendment 
to House Bill 32 on page 25, line 31. All in favor of that 
amendment say Aye. 
Response: Aye. 
President: Opposed no. (No response) Motion carried. 
President: Now, Senator Snow. 
Senator Snow: Let me direct your attention to the 
short page. I would propose on page 3, line 6 after the work 
"power" delete the lines "nullify the Commissioner of Public 
Safety as to such establishment" and in lieu thereof, insert 
the words "make application to the Commissioner of Public 
Safety and be certified by the Commissioner as (inaudible) the 
rules to regulations promulgated by the Department of Public 
Safety." Now let me indicate to you what we're dealing with 
here. We're looking at the category 1, police officer status 
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and where the same is given to institution of higher education 
and there appears to be considerable concern about that 
actiono I think most of it is not well understood, however* 
But in order to satisfy some of those concerns for what may be 
intemperate action or ill-prepared security services, we would 
reverse the situation here, rather than simply having them 
notify the Commissioner that they have established such 
security service that they seek permission and qualify for that 
status through the Commissioner of Public Safety. It would 
again require, of course, the Commissioner of Public Safety to 
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for making that 
determination* 
Presidents Are there questions to Senator Snow? 
Senators Mrc President, I might just comment that the 
Governor ask us to add this additional language on that section* 
Presidents Any further discussion? Now call for the 
motion to vote on Senator Snow's amendment on page 3, line 3* 
All those for his amendment say Aye. 
Response; Aye. 
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President; Opposed. (No response) No. Motion 
carries. 
Senator; He's always out of order. (Laughter) 
President; Senator Snow, do you have another one. 
Senator Snow; Yes, let me address all of them 
together and indicate to you what the purpose of these 
amendments are. It so happens that there was a Senate Bill 
that sought to accomplish essentially the same thing here. 
Senate Bill 37, which I ask to be tabled in committee because 
of this provision here in HB 32, which was covering the same 
section. Currently now, there are commitments made to the Utah 
State Hospital and the charges for that commitment under the 
present law are to born by the several counties. It seems that 
once those commitments are made that there is little interest 
on the part of the court for lifting that commitment even 
though the individual has completed the diagnosis or indeed the 
treatment and this remains to be a cost to be born by the 
hospital and, so, these amendments that you find on the buff 
colored page are intended to correct that problem and they're 
aimed at reducing the budgetary burdens that are placed upon 
the state hospital because of that and providing the procedure 
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whereby the hospital could return to the court and notify the 
court of the fashion of completion of its evaluation* 
Essentially, that what is accomplished here by the several 
amendments* 
Senator Renstrom; Mr* President. 
President; Senator Renstrom. 
Senator Renstroms I'm just a little confused Senator 
Snow. Are we talking about people here that have been 
committed by the court as a result of mental hearings as well 
as people that have been committed to the court who we've found 
not guilty by virtue of insanity? 
Senator Snows We're talking about individuals who 
have appeared before the court and, before the court does 
anything, they've remanded them, if you will, whatever term is 
appropriate for evaluation, to the Utah State Hospitalc 
Senator Renstrom; Well, if I understand what your 
trying to do, it would reduce the budget of the State Hospital 
but increase the budget of the counties. 
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Senator Snow: But, the law now really says that the 
county must assume that burden and that's clear under the 
statutes. I might indicate, however, that some counties 
unilaterally have decided that they don't want to do that but 
that is the law and I can cite that to you quite quickly* 
Senator Renstrom: I guess I'm still trying to find 
our what the gist of your amendment is. If its going to reduce 
the budget of at the Utah Hospital? 
Senator Snow: It will reduce the budget. Its going 
to reduce, I think, strains on the hospital because they're not 
now getting the dedicated credit that they ought to be 
collecting from the counties as required by the law because 
there seems to be some ambiguity but, secondly, once those 
commitments, I think that's the proper term to use, but be 
patient with me if it isn't, to the hospital, if you're sent 
there for thirty days and hospital can do nothing about it 
until the Judge lifts the order, even after thirty days and 
we're trying to avoid that so that the Director of the hospital 
can go back to the court and notify the court and . . . 
Senator Renstrom: That's always the truth. 
94-
Senator Snows That's correct. 
Senator Renstromg All right* 
President; Further questions on Senator Snow's 
amendment? 
Senator; I would move the adoption of the amendments 
on the buff colored sheet
 9 
Presidents To the Motion of Senator Snow6s , 1-5, 
page 35 and anything on page 40* All in favor of his amendment 
say Aye* 
Response; Aye. 
Presidents Opposed no« (No response) Motion 
carries. Do we have other amendments? 
Senator; If there are no further questions or 
discussions, Mr. President, I believe question on the bill. 
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